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THE BEHAVIOR  of real wages has complicated macroeconomic policy in 
the industrialized  world  during  the 1970s. Many  commentators  have dis- 
cussed  the extraordinary  increase  in wage inflation  in Europe  and Japan 
at the end of the last decade.1  Few have noted that the nominal  wage 
gains  resulted  in remarkable  increases  in real  wages.  The five large  econ- 
omies outside North America in the Organisation  for Economic Co- 
operation  and Development (OECD) had rapid growth  of real hourly 
compensation  in 1969-73, along with high rates of increase  of nominal 
compensation.  In most large OECD economies, real wages in the late 
1960s grew faster than productivity,  so that the distribution  of income 
shifted  toward  labor,  while the rate  of return  on capital  was substantially 
reduced. 
1. For a thorough econometric study, see George L. Perry, "Determinants of 
Wage Inflation around the World,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 403-35.  Another important 
study that focuses largely on the 1969-76 period is Robert J. Gordon, "World  Infla- 
tion and Monetary  Accommodation  in Eight Countries,"  BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 409-68. 
Further evidence for extraordinary  wage behavior in the late 1960s is provided by 
Erich Spitaller, "Semi-Annual  Wage Equations for the Manufacturing Sectors in 
Six  Major Industrial Countries," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,  vol.  112,  no.  2 
(1976),  pp. 300-37. In addition, from a vast sociological literature that focuses on 
wages and trade union behavior in the late 1960s, see the collections of essays in 
Solomon Barkin,  ed., Worker  Militancy and Its Consequences,  1965-75: New Direc- 
tions  in  Western Industrial Relations  (Praeger,  1975);  and  Colin  Crouch and 
Alessandro Pizzorno, eds., The Resurgence of  Class Conflict in  Western Europe 
Since 1968, vol.  1: National Stucdies,  and vol. 2:  Comparative Analyses (Holmes 
and Meier, 1978). 
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In Europe  and Japan  the profit  squeeze  intensified  after  the oil, food, 
and productivity  shocks  of the 1972-74 period.  Real wages decelerated 
only slowly  in the face of these disturbances,  and much  of the burden  of 
the supply  shocks  was shifted  to the quasi-rents  of capital  in the short  run. 
In the United  States,  on the other  hand,  real  wages  decelerated  markedly 
in 1973 and 1974. In Canada,  a large  net exporter  of primary  commodi- 
ties, the shift in terms  of trade  toward  these goods increased  profits  and 
the  scope  for  growth  in real  wages. 
Because  of the external  supply  shocks  and contractionary  policies,  the 
world economy  entered  the deep slump  of 1974-75. The policy debate 
that followed  is at the center  of this paper.  In a variety  of international 
forums,  the United  States  urged  expansionary  policy  in Europe  and  Japan 
to bring  about  a cyclical  recovery.2  The advice  was largely  rejected,  and 
not merely  because  Europe  and  Japan  had different  tastes  for unemploy- 
ment and inflation  in the short run. The distinct  policy choices followed 
from  differing  views  on many  issues.  Two differences  were  particularly  im- 
portant  for this analysis:  whether  a deceleration  of real wages  after 1974 
was a prerequisite  for sustained recovery, and whether expansionary 
policy  or austerity  was the best approach  to moderating  real  wages.  Euro- 
pean  and  Japanese  policymakers  answered  the first  question  affirmatively. 
In light  of the rapid  growth  in real  wages  since 1969 and  the failure  of real 
wages  to decelerate  sufficiently  in response  to the supply  shocks  in 1972- 
74, they adopted  a classical  interpretation  of the business  cycle, arguing 
2. In ministerial meetings of the Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD),  the  United States endorsed a  "locomotive" strategy, in 
which joint expansion of West Germany, Japan, and the United States was to lead 
smaller economies out of  the recession. Continuing the transport metaphor, the 
United States later heralded a "convoy"  approach, in which strong economies both 
large and small would lead to a world economic expansion. A good source for study- 
ing the U.S. policy position over time is the Economic Report of  the President, 
various years. Throughout,  there is a sustained argument for vigorous expansion of 
demand and a minimization of the risks of expansion in conditions of widespread 
unemployment.  It is argued that monetary expansion will not lead to greater infla- 
tion, except under conditions of high utilization of capacity. A typical proposition 
is found in the 1978 Economic Report, pp. 114-15:  "A program for achieving full 
recovery in the industrial economies must begin with measures to raise domestic 
demand and capacity utilization. Only then is  sufficient investment likely to  be 
forthcoming to achieve structural objectives....  Both monetary and fiscal policy 
can make a contribution.  With excess capacity everywhere,  world recovery can pro- 
ceed without undue concern that reasonable expansionary policies will  trigger a 
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that real wages  were too high for full employment.  They pointed  to low 
rates  of profitability  as a barrier  to rapid  expansion.  Moreover,  there  was 
widespread  doubt,  voiced by economists  in West Germany  in particular, 
that  expansionary  policies  could moderate  real wages.  And they rejected 
the Keynesian  view that  the stickiness  of nominal  wages  made  it possible 
for policy-induced  price  inflation  to reduce  real wages. 
Different  conclusions  on both  issues  could  be drawn  from  U.S. data.  In 
the United  States  real wages  slowed sharply  during  1973-75, in part  be- 
cause  of the stickiness  of nominal  wages,  so that  a classical  explanation  of 
the recession  found  few adherents.  The deep  recession  in the  United  States 
was attributed  to demand factors, including the failure of monetary 
authorities  to accommodate  the increase in oil prices, the transfer  of 
wealth  to OPEC,  and perhaps  a decline  in investment  demand  from the 
complementarity  between energy and capital. Expansionary  fiscal and 
monetary  policies  were  seen as desirable  instruments  to effect  recovery. 
In this paper  I focus on the differing  patterns  of real wage behavior  in 
these  large  industrial  economies  and on the resulting  differences  in views 
about macroeconomic  policy. I argue that the concern in Europe and 
Japan  about real wage behavior  and profitability  has been appropriate, 
in light of the progressive  squeeze on profits  until the mid-1970s. On a 
more subtle point, I present evidence to show that moderation  in real 
wages  could not be achieved  in Europe  with inflationary  policy. Because 
of wage-setting  institutions  outside North America, little opportunity 
arises  to exploit  nominal  wage rigidities  in policymaking.  To be explicit, 
unionized  labor markets  in the United States and Canada  have the dis- 
tinctive feature of overlapping,  long-term  wage agreements,  which are 
only partially  indexed.  The other  economies  each  have  some  combination 
of short-term  contracts,  high indexation,  or centralized  bargaining.  Ac- 
cording  to the theory  presented  in the last section,  these institutional  ar- 
rangements  lead to a relatively  strong  link between  monetary  policy and 
output  in the United States, and to a dominant  link between monetary 
policy and  prices  in the European  and Japanese  economies.  Econometric 
evidence  supports  this conclusion,  as do specific  historical  episodes  in a 
number  of countries. 
The  paper  begins  with  a description  of wage  behavior  in the seven  large 
OECD economies  during  1969-78. I look at the wage boom in the late 
1960s and  the consequent  shifts  in factor  shares  and  profitability.  In some 
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shocks in terms  of trade and productivity  for real wages in 1973-75, 
and conclude  that a second profit squeeze followed these disturbances 
in Europe  and Japan.  In the second  section I examine  the impact  of the 
wage  movements  on output  and  profitability.  The slower  growth  of manu- 
facturing  since 1970 appears  to be closely linked to the profit squeeze 
following  the wage  boom. In the final  section  of the paper,  I offer  a brief 
summary  of the wage-setting  institutions  in the various  economies  and an 
analysis  of how these institutions  help to shape the appropriate  use of 
monetary  policy for recovery from a profit squeeze or for control of 
inflation. 
Real  Wages  in Major  OECD  Countries,  1969-78 
This section  covers  the developments  in real wages in the seven large 
OECD economies,  describing  the shared  as well as the specific  features 
of the patterns.  The tables that follow focus mainly  on four subperiods: 
1962-69, 1969-73, 1973-75, and 1975-78. The 1962-69 period  serves 
as a benchmark;  in that period,  the rate of growth  of product  wages  was 
almost  identical  to that of productivity  in most countries.  The first  and 
largest  part  of this section  is devoted  to 1969-73, which  displayed  a sig- 
nificant  acceleration  in real wages  in Japan  and the four  European  coun- 
tries.  I then turn  to the interesting  subsequent  developments  in 1973-75 
and 1975-78. 
It is importaint  to relate  the behavior  of nominal  wages,  W,  both to the 
prices  of the goods and services  produced  by workers  and  to the prices  of 
the goods and services  that they buy as consumers.  With  Pv representing 
the deflator  for  value-added  at factor  cost, the ratio W/PV  may  be denoted 
as the product  wage. When TY  is divided  by the consumer  price deflator, 
Pa, the resulting  ratio  is the real  wage.  In addition,  I highlight  the share  of 
labor  compensation  in total value-added,  WL/VPV,  where  V is real  value 
added and L, labor input, measured  here as total hours worked. Thus 
labor's  share  is equivalently  the ratio  of the product  wage  to the average 
productivity  of labor, V/L. Because  manufacturing  is the dominant  sec- 
tor producing  tradable  goods in these OECD countries,  the data  on com- 
pensation  are also presented  for manufacturing  and the entire  economy. 
Although  I would  like to focus separately  on the private  nonmanufactur- 
ing sector  (the dominant  producer  of nontradable  or "home"  goods), data Jeffrey  D. Sachs  273 
Table 1. Rates of Growth  of Real and  Nominal  Hourly  Compensation  for the 
Manufacturing  Sector and the Aggregate  Economy,  by Country,  Selected  Periods, 
1962-78 
Annual average,  in percent 
Sector, measure,  United  United 




1962-69  2.9  4.2  5.1  6.2  7.6  2.9  1.9 
1969-73  3.4  5.9  7.9  11.7  9.5  4.3  1.5 
1973-75  3.8  6.4  7.2  7.4  5.2  6.0  0.8 
1975-78  2.2  4.4  4.3  1.9  0.8  1.3  2.1 
Nominal 
compensation 
1962-69  6.1  8.2  7.6  10.5  13.4  6.8  4.7 
1969-73  8.2  12.5  13.6  19.0  17.7  12.7  6.5 
1973-75  15.1  19.9  14.1  26.7  24.1  27.2  10.9 
1975-78  10.5  14.1  8.1  17.5  7.9  15.0  8.9 
Aggregate  econony 
Real 
compensation 
1962-69  3.7  5.7  5.4  8.3  8.0  2.9  3.4 
1969-73  3.0  5.9  8.2  9.8  11.6  4.6  2.7 
1973-75  4.8  5.9  5.7  7.0  5.3  6.3  -0.3 
1975-78  1.6  5.2  3.3  1.8  2.2  -1.3  1.9 
Nominal 
compensation 
1962-69  6.9  9.8  8.0  12.6  13.8  6.8  6.2 
1969-73  7.8  12.5  13.9  17.0  19.9  13.0  7.8 
1973-75  16.2  19.3  12.5  26.3  24.2  27.7  9.7 
1975-78  9.9  15.0  7.0  17.4  9.4  12.0  8.6 
Sources: See appendix A. 
for such a disaggregation  of most of the variables  are  not available  or are 
not reliable  for many  countries. 
WAGES  IN  1969-73 
Table  1 shows  the sharp  acceleration  in nominal  wages  during  1969-73 
in the large economies  outside North America. Perry documented  this 
phenomenon  for the manufacturing  sector.3  I constructed  data for all 
3.  Perry,  "Determinants  of Wage Inflation." 274  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
sectors  to demonstrate  that the wage boom was experienced  throughout 
the economy. Because the manufacturing  sector is typically the most 
unionized  sector  of the economy,  it might  be supposed  that the accelera- 
tion  represented  a union  phenomenon  that  was not replicated  outside  that 
sector.  As explained  in appendix  A, the aggregate  wage measures  are  not 
precise,  but they  indicate  that  the acceleration  was general. 
Whether  a nominal  wage boom translates  into higher  real wages de- 
pends  on a number  of additional  factors  that I discuss  in subsequent  sec- 
tions. At this point it suffices  to record  that the nominal  wage boom re- 
sulted  in large  gains  in real  wages (table 1  ) and  in product  wages  (table  2) 
in countries  outside North America. This is just the mirror  image of 
Robert  Gordon's  finding  that the acceleration  in wage inflation  did not 
lead to a comparable  acceleration  in price  inflation;  prices  did not rise in 
proportion  to the  nominal  wage  increase.4 
The data  in table  2 show  the growth  in product  wages  and  average  pro- 
ductivity  in the manufacturing  sector  and in the entire  economy  for each 
country.  The product  wage in manufacturing  accelerates  sharply  during 
1969-73 in all countries  outside North America. The growth of labor 
productivity  remains  about  the same as it was earlier  or slows slightly.  In 
the aggregate  economy,  A, product  wages  also accelerate,  but in Germany 
and the United  Kingdom  not to the extent  seen in manufacturing,  M. In 
those countries (W/Pv)M  accelerates more sharply than does  (W/Pv)A, 
while  according  to table 1, WM  and WA  accelerate  at about  the same  rate. 
Evidently, PVA increases more rapidly than PvM. For reasons discussed be- 
low, more of the nominal  wage push is passed on in prices outside the 
manufacturing  sector. 
The acceleration  of product  wages  relative  to productivity  resulted  in a 
shift  in factor  shares,  particularly  within  the manufacturing  sector.  This is 
shown  in table  3. With  the exception  of Japan,  factor  shares  for the aggre- 
gate  economy  were  stable  in the 1960s.5  Beginning  with  the wage  boom  in 
4.  See Gordon, "World  Inflation and Monetary Accommodation,"  especially pp. 
446-47. 
5. Some evidence exists that the stability of factor shares in the sixties is greater 
than it was in earlier years. For data extending back to the mid-fifties, see T.  P. 
Hill, Profits and Rates of Return (Paiis:  OECD, 1979). In some countries, a secu- 
lar rise in labor's share is arrested in the sixties and then resumed in the seventies. 
From a long historical  perspective,  the decade of the sixties might be as remarkable 
for high profits  and rapid growth as the seventies is for low profits and slow growth. 
This paper attempts  to show that the change from the sixties to the seventies in real 
wages and profits  contributed  to the slowdown in output, not that the former decade 
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Table  2. Rates of Growth  in the Product  Wage and  in Labor  Productivity  for the 
Manufacturing  Sector and the Aggregate  Economy,  by Country, 
Selected  Periods,  1962-78 
Annual average,  in percent 
Sector, measure,  United  United 
and  period  Canada  France  Germany Italy  Japant  Kingdom  States 
Manufacturing 
Product  wage 
1962-69  5.0  4.8  5.6  7.4  10.8  4.6  3.4 
1969-73  3.6  7.0  7.5  9.7  12.6  5.6  3.6 
1973-75  0.1  6.2  6.8  4.4  0.6  4.6  0.1 
1975-78  n.a.  4.8  5.4a  2.0  8.9  -1.4a  3.0 
Labor productivity 
1962-69  4.5  6.3  5.9  6.8  11.2  4.5  3.1 
1969-73  4.4  5.4  4.8  6.9  8.7  4.1  3.2 
1973-75  -0.4  2.8  5.2  0.4  -1.8  -1.3  -0.3 
1975-78  4.5  6.1  5.0  4.1  7.3  1.2  3.0 
Aggregate  economy 
Product  wage 
1962-69  3.6  5.1  5.0  7.8  8.5  3.2  3.1 
1969-73  2.0  5.5  6.3  7.9  12.2  3.7  2.6 
1973-75  1.5  5.1  4.8  6.0  8.6  4.9  0.2 
1975-78  1.8  5.2  2.7  1.2  2.7  1.5  2.3 
Labor productivity 
1962-69  3.3  5.2  5.3  7.4  9.9  3.1  2.7 
1969-73  3.2  5.7  5.2  6.6  9.1  3.9  2.6 
1973-75  0.7  2.6  4.0  3.0  3.9  0.7  0.3 
1975-78  2.0  5.0  4.5  1.3  4.1  2.0  2.1 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a.  Data are for the 1975-77 period. 
n.a. Not available. 
about 1969, the share of labor compensation increased sharply in Japan 
and in the European countries, with the exception of France. There, a 
large drop in labor's share in manufacturing in 1969  (following  the de- 
preciation of the franc)  balanced the upward movement from  1969  to 
1973.  In Japan, although the  1969-73  average shows only a small in- 
-crease  in labor's share, that share rose steeply in 1972-73,  reaching 0.57 
in manufacturing in  1973.  Note  that labor's share rose in the United 
States, although wages did not surge. Rather, a sharp deceleration of pro- 
ductivity after 1966 was accompanied by fairly constant growth of real 
wages into the early 1970s. The contrasting  mechanisms  through  which 276  Brookings Papers otn Economic  Activity, 2:1979 
Table 3. Shares  of Labor  Compensation  in Value-Added  in Manufacturing,  Private 
Nonmanufacturing,  and  the Aggregate  Economy,  by Country,  Selected  Periods, 
1962-78 
Proportion 
Country  and  sector  1962-64  1965-68  1969-73  1973-75  1975-78 
Canada 
Manufacturing  0.65  0.68  0.69  0.66  n.a. 
Private  nonmanufacturing  0.64  0.62  0.62  0.60  n.a. 
Aggregate  economy  0.68  0.69  0.69  0.68  0.69 
France 
Manufacturing  0.52  0.52  0.50  0.54  0.54 
Private  nonmanufacturing  0.72  0.71  0.71  0.71  n.a. 
Aggregate  economy  0.68  0.67  0.66  0.68  0.70 
Germany 
Manufacturing  0.63  0.62  0.66  0.70  0.71a 
Private  nonmanufacturing  0.72  0.71  0.70  0.70  n.a. 
Aggregate  economy  0.71  0.70  0.71  0.73  0.72 
Italy 
Manufacturing  0.64  0.62  0.69  0.70  0.72 
Private  nonmanufacturing  0.71  0.70  0.72  0.76  n.a. 
Aggregate  economy  0.72  0.71  0.74  0.77  0.79 
Japan 
Manufacturing  0.51  0.51  0.52  0.59  0.62 
Private  nonmanufacturing  0.75  0.71  0.73  n.a.  n.a. 
Aggregate  economy  0.69  0.66  0.67  0.74  0.77 
United  Kingdom 
Manufacturing  0.70  0.71  0.75  0.82  0.84a 
Private  nonmanufacturing  0.69  0.69  0.69  0.68  n.a. 
Aggregate  economy  0.72  0.73  0.74  0.76  0.77 
United  States 
Manufacturing  0.76  0.75  0.79  0.81  0.79 
Private  nonmanufacturing  0.63  0.63  0.66  0.66  n.a. 
Aggregate  economy  0.71  0.71  0.74  0.74  0.73 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a.  Data are for the 1975-77 period. 
n.a.  Not available. 
factor shares  changed  in the United States and Europe will be explored 
further  below. 
According to production  theory, an acceleration  of product wages 
should lower the rate of return  to capital,  for a given technology.  The 
factor-price  frontier  defines  a negative  relationship  between  the marginal 
product  of labor  and  the marginal  product  of capital.  If the product  wage Jeffrey  D. Sachs  277 
is approximately  equal to the marginal  product  of labor, a higher  wage 
will be matched  by a lower marginal  product  of capital. (With technical 
change,  the entire  factor-price  frontier  shifts,  and a secular  rise in wages 
need not signal  anything  about  the rate  of return  to capital.) A variety  of 
studies  suggest,  in fact, that rates  of return  to capital  fell sharply  during 
1969-73, in line with the increase  in wages  and labor's  share  of income.6 
Table 4 provides  data on profitability  for the 1962-76 period.7  The 
data parallel that for movements  in factor shares shown above. Profit 
rates rose in some countries  and  fell in others  in the 1960s, but fell in the 
early  1  970s in all countries  except  France. 
WHAT  CAUSED  THE  1969-73  WAGE  EXPLOSION? 
The cause of the wage explosion  of the early 1970s is a problem  that 
deserves  and  has received  extensive  study.  Here, I focus  on the European, 
Japanese,  and North  American  experiences.  I summarize  some results  of 
the historical  analysis  to underline  that  the European  wage  developments 
represent  events  that are in large  part  exogenous  to the short-run  macro- 
economic  system,  as typically  modeled. 
In the European  setting,  at least three  factors  contributed  to the rapid 
expansion  of real wages and the decline  in profits  in the early seventies. 
First,  the wage  behavior  reflects  in part  a catch-up  of wages  that  were  con- 
strained  by incomes  policies since the mid-sixties,  and in part a reaction 
to unusually  high profits  in the late sixties.  Second, the sustained  period 
of high  employment  in the sixties,  and  specific  episodes  of industrial  strife 
late in that decade, led to important  institutional  gains in union power 
6. Accurate measures of  profitability are difficult to  obtain, both because of 
conceptual  and empirical  problems with capital stock data, and because of inflation- 
induced errors  in the measurement  of profits. The measure of profitability  used here 
is capital income as a percentage of the capital stock valued at replacement cost. 
Under competitive conditions, sectoral profitability will  approximately equal the 
marginal  product of capital divided by the price of new capital goods relative to the 
price of sectoral output. Thus the rate of return  declines when the marginal product 
of capital falls or when the relative price of capital goods increases.  The latter change 
has had little influence on secular developments in profitability  because changes in 
the relative price of capital goods have been small. 
7.  Although Hill provides valuable profit rate measures for all countries in this 
study, I also used detailed studies of profitability  trends in individual countries. See 
his Profits  and Rates of Return. 
The concerns  of note 5 apply here also. By comparison with the 1950s, profitabil- 
ity in the 1960s was high (particularly  in Japan and the United States) or else slowed 
a downward  trend in the rate of return (particularly  in Germany). 278  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1979 
Table 4. Real Rates  of Return  on Corporate  Capital,  by Country,  1962-76a 
Percent 
Year  or  United  United 
period  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  Kingdom  States 
1969  9.8  11.5  20.7  12.2  30.6  10.1  10.2 
1970  6.6  11.5  18.2  11.5  28.1  8.7  8.1 
1971  8.4  10.6  15.6  9.4  23.5  8.7  8.4 
1972  9.4  12.3  13.4  9.9  20.2  8.6  9.2 
1973  11.4  11.8  12.9  n.a.  15.7  7.2  8.6 
1974  11.4  10.8  12.7  n.a.  13.1  4.0  6.4 
1975  8.2  5.2  10.0  n.a.  13.9  3.4  6.9 
1976  8.1  n.a.  11.4  n.a.  n.a.  3.6  7.9 
Average 
1962-64  7.9  9.7  19.3  10.4  28.2  11.9  12.0 
1965-69  9.6  10.0  19.5  11.4  27.9  10.6  12.2 
1970-73  9.0  11.6  15.0  10.3b  21.9  8.3  8.6 
1974-76  9.2  8.0c  11.4  n.a.  13.5c  3.7  7.1 
Sources: Canada-A.  Tarasovsky and T.  G.  Roseman,  "Ex-Post Real  Rates  of  Return in  Canada: 
1947-1976" (Ottawa: Economic Council of  Canada, forthcoming in  1979); France-Mervyn  King and 
Jacques Mairesse, "Profitability  in Britain  and France, A Comparative  Study, 1965-1975" (Paris: National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Research, 1978), table 2.1;  Germany, Italy, and Japan-T.  P. Hill, 
Profits anid  Rates of  Return (Padis: Organlisation  for  Economic Co-operation and  Development,  1979), 
p.  123; United  Kingdom-T.  A. Clark and N.  P. Williams, "Measures of Real  Profitability," Bank of 
E,zglaond  Quarterly Bulletin, vol.  18 (December 1978), p. 516; and  United States-Martin  Feldstein and 
Lawrence Summers, "Is the Rate of Profit Falling?" BPEA, 1:1977, p. 216. 
a.  The profitability  measure used here is capital income as a percentage of the capital stock measured at 
replacement cost. All series are pre-tax real rates of return net of depreciation. For Canada, thle  data refer 
to the manufacturing sector; for France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, the corporate manufacturing sector; 
for the United Kingdom, the industrial  and coimercial  sector; and for the United States, the nonfinancial 
corporate sector. 
b. Data are for the 1970-72 period. 
c.  Data are for the 1974-75 period. 
n.a.  Not available. 
and coverage.  Third,  after  the increases  in real  wages  occurred,  they  were 
partially  or fully ratified  by expansionary  policy  in the early  seventies. 
Soskice has provided  a fascinating  analysis  of the wage explosion in 
terms of the first factor. With great attention  to institutional  detail, he 
records  that  European  economies  recovered  from  the recession  in the  mid- 
sixties  with national  unions  committed  to incomes  policies  and  long-term 
wage agreements.  It is because  of these policies, in his view, that labor's 
share  was stable  or actually  falling  throughout  Europe  during  the 1966- 
69 period. Country  by country,  dissatisfaction  among the rank and file 
with union participation  in incomes  policies led to the dramatic  wildcat 
strikes  in 1969-70 that  heralded  the  wage  acceleration.  Indeed,  the  widely 
recognized  surge  in labor  militancy  came  first,  not in official  union  action, Jeffrey  D. Sachs  279 
but in the critical  response  of workers  to union inaction.  A provocative 
aspect  of the Soskice  thesis  is that the size of the wage  settlements,  "con- 
siderably  greater  than could be accounted  for by conventional  economic 
factors,"  served  in part  to "enable  the unions  to regain  control  of the situa- 
tion, a desire  common  to governments  and  employers  as well as unions."8 
To explain  why the modest  deceleration  of real  wages  in the late sixties 
should  have been followed  by enormous  growth  in real  wages  lasting  until 
the mid-seventies,  the second factor is important:  the developments  of 
the sixties  led to important  changes  in the process  of wage determination. 
For example,  the upheaval  in France in May 1968 brought  with it the 
government-backed  Grenelle  accords  that called for a large,  one-time  in- 
crease in real wages, and obliged  employers  to negotiate  with unions  on 
economic  demands.  In December  1968, the labor law conferred  recog- 
nition for the first  time on plant-based  bargaining.  The "hot autumn"  of 
1969 in Italy, tied to union negotiations  in the metal  sector,  also created 
large gains  in wages and longer-lasting  institutional  changes.  The Italian 
Parliament  enacted  the "1970 Workers'  Charter"  on union  rights,  extend- 
ing union  powers  at the plant  level. Moreover,  a rapid  growth  of member- 
ship in Italian unions occurred  during  the period, from 4.5 million in 
1968 to 6 million in 1973.9  Even more important,  the three competing 
trade  union federations  in Italy embarked  on a common  program  after 
1969, substantially  strengthening  the common  front of the labor move- 
ment.  In Germany,  wildcat  strikes  in the steel and  coal industries  in 1969 
led the trade  unions  to abandon  the incomes  policy that  had existed  since 
the beginning  of the "concerted  action"  policy in 1967. "Trade  unions 
drew  more  of the active  union elements  into their  policy-making  forums, 
steering  toward a more active wage policy to demonstrate  their legiti- 
macy."10  In the United  Kingdom,  new institutional  changes  were  designed 
to limit  union  power,  but instead  they brought  forth  a tremendous  flexing 
of that  power.  Widespread  strike  activity  made  union  power  a central  elec- 
tion issue in 1970 and presaged,  under a Conservative  government,  the 
8. David Soskice, "Strike Waves and Wage Explosions, 1968-1970:  An  Eco- 
nomic Interpretation,"  in Crouch and Pizzorno, eds., Resurgence of Class Conflict, 
vol. 2: Comparative  Analyses, pp. 244-45. 
9.  Pietro Merli Brandini, "Italy: Creating a New  Industrial Relations System 
from the Bottom,"  in Barkin,  ed., Worker  Militancy,  p. 97. 
10. Joachim Bergmann  and Walther Muller-Jentsch,  "The Federal Republic of 
Germany: Cooperative Unionism and Dual  Bargaining System Challenged," in 
ibid., p. 260. 280  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
1971 Industrial  Relations  Act. In turn,  the three  years  under  the act,  until 
its repeal  in 1974 by the new Labour  government,  "witnessed  the most 
direct confrontation  between the unions and the government  since the 
General  Strike  of 1926."11-  The period  was marked  by a large  increase  in 
union membership,  from 42 percent  of the work force in the mid-1960s 
to about  47 percent  by 1970. 
Finally, the gains in real wages were maintained  because of govern- 
ment support,  either explicitly in the wage-setting  process or through 
expansionary  fiscal  policies that maintained  high employment  in ways I 
shall discuss  below. 
The wage experience  in Japan and the North American  economies 
during  the 1969-73 period  may be explained  in more prosaic  economic 
terms.  Conventional  equations  can track  the wage changes,  in contrast  to 
the European  case.12  In Japan,  the rapid growth  of real wages resulted 
largely  from  an excess demand  for labor;  demographic  factors  brought  to 
a halt the migration  of labor to manufacturing  from other sectors.'3  As 
will be seen in the next section, high real wages substantially  slowed 
growth  in the manufacturing  sector  in Japan.  The high real  wages  did not 
lead  to significant  unemployment  there,  but  rather  to the equilibration  of a 
tightening  labor market.  In the United States,  as noted above, the rising 
labor share came about because productivity  growth  slowed without a 
commensurate  slowdown  in real wages. Given the small effect  of unem- 
ployment  on nominal  wages in the United States,  the increases  in unem- 
ployment  in the early 1970s were  insufficient  to bring  real  wages  into line 
with  lower  productivity  growth. 
11. John F. B. Goodman, "Great Britain: Toward the Social Contract,"  in ibid., 
p. 47. 
12. See Perry, "Determinants  of Wage Inflation."  In a variety of wage equations, 
a  "wage explosion" dummy variable is statistically significant for  the  European 
economies, but not for Japan or the North American economies. The equations for 
Japan seem to track adequately for 1960-72. 
13. "As the work force was gradually absorbed from agriculture,  the supply of 
labor became increasingly unable to  meet the requirements for  sustaining rapid 
expansion, particularly  in the manufacturing sector. This resulted in a significant 
tightening  of the labor market-in  the early 1970s, the ratio of jobs offered to jobs 
wanted (the most sensitive indicator of the Japanese labor market) doubled from 
an average of  100 per cent (one job offer per applicant) during the 1960s." From 
Kunio Saito, "The  Japanese  Economy in Transition,"  International  Monetary Fund, 
Finance and Development,  vol. 14 (June 1977), p. 38. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  281 
WAGES  IN  1973-75 
As evident  in table 1, the growth  of real wages displayed  divergent 
patterns  among the various countries  during 1973-75.  In France, the 
economy-wide  growth  during  that period  matched  the rate of 1969-73; 
it was  substantially  higher  in Canada  and  the United  Kingdom;  and  it was 
lower  in Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  and the United  States.  Indeed,  in Japan, 
the United  States,  and Italy,  the growth  was lower  than  it had been  in the 
1962-69 period.  During  this interval,  the behavior  of real wages  must  be 
interpreted  against  the background  of two important  developments:  a 
slowdown  in productivity  and an adverse  shift  in the terms  of trade  of the 
large  countries  associated  with major  price  increases  in food and then in 
oil. Those two developments  "warranted"  a sharp  deceleration  of wages, 
in the sense that  I describe  below. In the absence  of that sharp  decelera- 
tion, real  wages  in Europe  and  Japan  continued  to squeeze  profits  and  put 
upward  pressure  on labor's  share. 
Both within  manufacturing  and in the economy  as a whole, labor  pro- 
ductivity  slowed abruptly  in 1973-75  (see table 2).  Much of the slow- 
down  in productivity  can be attributed  to the recession  but, importantly, 
much  of it cannot.  Even during  the recovery  period  of 1975-78, produc- 
tivity growth  was at or below the average  rates of 1962-73 in all seven 
countries  and  far  below that  average  in Italy,  Japan,  and  the United  King- 
dom.  It is remarkable  that  the productivity  "lost"  during  1973-75 was  not 
made  up in the  next  three  years.  Clearly  the  productivity  slowdown,  which 
has been hotly discussed  in the United States,  is a worldwide  phenom- 
enon. 
It is exceedingly  difficult  to separate  cyclical  variations  from shifts in 
trend  productivity  during  1973-78. Econometric  measurements  of trend 
productivity  usually  rely on a notion of trend output, trend  hours, or a 
natural  rate of unemployment.14 But given the huge change in growth 
rates  during  1973-78 compared  with  the previous  decade,  these  concepts 
are particularly  hard to measure.  Precise estimates  of full-employment 
gross domestic  product  are questionable  because  it is not clear whether 
large  productivity  gains  will accompany  complete  recovery  when (and if) 
14. For a study using potential output, see William D. Nordhaus, "The Recent 
Productivity  Slowdown,"  BPEA, 3:1972, pp. 493-536; for one using potential man- 
hours, see George L. Perry, "Potential Output and Productivity,"  BPEA, 1:1977, 
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that  occurs  in the future.  To measure  the trend  of hours  worked,  as Perry 
has done,  requires  detailed  demographic  data  that  is not readily  available 
for each  country. 
The average  rate of productivity  growth  for 1973-78 can serve as a 
reasonable  guess of "trend"  productivity  growth  for 1973-75. Much of 
the cyclical  variation  in productivity  is merely a matter  of timing,  with 
decreases  in labor  input  lagging  a slowdown  in output  for a few quarters. 
The reliance  on the average  of the period  from 1973 to 1978 allows an 
interval  of three  years after  the cyclical  trough  for adjustments  to elimi- 
nate  excess  labor.15  Comparing  the average  annual  rate  of growth  of GDP 
per hour  worked  in 1973-78 with that during  1962-73, a slowdown  is 
evident  in all countries,  with the following magnitudes  (in percentage 
points): Canada,  1.8; France, 1.3; Germany,  1.0; Italy, 5.1; Japan,  5.6; 
United  Kingdom,  1.9; and  United  States, 1.3. 
Another important  force that reduced  the scope for growth of real 
wages  was the shift in the terms  of trade  toward  imported  primary  com- 
modities,  mainly  food and energy.  The importance  of the adverse  shift 
for the growth  of real wages may be measured  by the movement  of the 
deflator  of GDP at factor  cost, Pv, relative  to the consumer  price index, 
P.. In particular,  P.  rises relative to Pv when import prices rise more 
rapidly  than domestic prices or when the rate of indirect  taxation in- 
creases.16  In either  case, when Pc/Pv rises, real wages  must  increase  less 
rapidly than productivity if factor shares are to remain constant. By sim- 
ple algebra,  labor's  share,  WL/PvV, is constant  when real wages, W/Pc, 
grow  at the  following  rate: 
(1)  g  (W~) =  g  (V)  +  g 
15. This  approximation will  overestimate the  1973-75  growth rate  of  full- 
employment productivity to the extent that 1973-75  was characterized by a one- 
time productivity  decline in response to the increase in energy prices. It will under- 
estimate the productivity  trend to the extent that further productivity  dividends will 
be gained by greater cyclical recovery after 1978. 
16. I state the relationship  between Pv and Pc in these terms because a specific 
decomposition  of movements in PclPv  depends on the aggregative structure  of the 
model used. In almost any model, PclPv  will rise when final prices of exportable 
goods fall relative to final prices of importable  goods, or when the prices of import- 
able intermediate  goods rises relative to final prices of  world goods. The relative 
movements of Pc and Pv are described  at some length in Michael Bruno and Jeffrey 
Sachs, "Macro-economic  Adjustment  with Import Price Shocks: Real and Monetary 
Aspects,"  Working  Paper 340 (National Bureau  of Economic Research,  April 1979). Jeffrey  D. Sachs  283 
where  g() is the  percentage  growth  rate  of the ratio  expressed  in parenthe- 
ses. In fact, Pv/P0  had risen in all countries  in 1969-73; it rose more 
slowly (or actually  fell) during  1973-75 in most of the large  economies, 
reducing  the scope for growth  of real wages. 
Table  5 uses equation  1 to determine  the rate of growth  of real wages 
consistent  with  constant  factor  shares  in the two subperiods,  1969-73 and 
1973-75, simply  by adding  g(Pv/P0)  to the trend  growth  of productivity 
in each period.  I focus on trend  productivity  growth  to abstract  from  the 
part  of the productivity  slowdown  that is cyclically  induced  and presum- 
ably transitory.  As above,  I measure  the trend  growth  of productivity  for 
1973-75 as the average  growth  for 1973-78; the trend for 1969-73 is 
measured  by  the 1962-73 average. 
I make  a simple  attempt  to separate  the two major  factors  in the move- 
ment  in Pv/Pc:  changes  in indirect  taxes and shifts in the terms  of trade. 
The  term  Pv/Pc  can  be written  as (Pv/Pv)  *  (PM/Pc), where  Pv is the  deflator 
at factor  cost, and  Pv is the deflator  at market  prices,  inclusive  of indirect 
taxes. In table 5,  g(Pv/Pc)  is  called the terms-of-trade  effect because 
movements  in Pr/Pc  reflect  changes  in relative  market  prices;  g(Pv/P') 
is the indirect-tax  effect, reflecting  changes  in the average  indirect  tax 
rate. 
Note that  the warranted  growth  of real  wages  dropped  significantly  after 
1973  in all countries  except  Canada.  In most countries,  the slower  growth 
of productivity  has the largest  effect,  but the shifts in terms  of trade  also 
contribute  to the warranted  slowdown.  In every country  except Canada 
and the United Kingdom,  Pl/Pc  slows down during  1973-75  relative  to 
1969-73.  This appears  in table  5 as a decline  during  1973-75  in the contri- 
bution  of the terms-of-trade  effect  to warranted  growth  of real wages.  In 
Canada  the deflator  increases  far more rapidly  than consumer  prices  dur- 
ing 1973-75,  reflecting  Canada's  special  position  as an exporter  of primary 
commodities  in a period when the price of crude  materials  rose steeply 
relative  to final  goods. Japan,  the most heavily  dependent  of the seven  on 
foreign  sources  of primary  commodities,  suffers  the largest  deterioration 
in terms  of trade.  During 1973-75, consumer  prices  in Japan  rose more 
than  four  percentage  points a year  faster  than  the GDP deflator  at market 
prices. In almost all countries  the average  rate of indirect  taxation fell 
during  1969-75,  with larger  drops generally  in 1973-75.  These  declines  in 
tax rates  moderated  the needed  slowdown  in real  wages  because  they low- 
ered  consumer  prices  relative  to the net prices  received  by firms.  A partic- 284  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
Table 5. Rates of Growth  of the Warranted  Real Wage and  Its Components  and  of 
Actual  Real Wages  for the Aggregate  Economy,  by Country,  Selected  Periods, 1969-75 
Annual average,  in percent 
Warranted  real wagea 
Component 
Country  and  Productivity  Terms  of  Indirect  Actual 
period  Total  trendb  tradec  tax rated  real wage 
Canada 
1969-73  4.2  3.2  0.8  0.2  3.0 
1973-75  4.7  1.5  2.1  1.1  4.8 
France 
1969-73  5.7  5.4  0.0  0.3  5.9 
1973-75  4.2  4.0  -0.9  1.1  5.9 
Germany 
1969-73  7.1  5.3  1.3  0.5  8.2 
1973-75  5.2  4.3  0.6  0.3  5.7 
Italy 
1969-73  8.9  7.1  1.3  0.5  9.8 
1973-75  3.0  2.0  -0.4  1.4  7.0 
Japan 
1969-73  9.1  9.6  -0.6  0.1  11.6 
1973-75  1.0  4.0  -3.5  0.5  5.3 
United  Kingdom 
1969-73  4.2  3.4  0.0  0.8  4.6 
1973-75  2.9  1.5  0.9  0.5  6.3 
United  States 
1969-73  2.7  2.6  0.1  0.0  2.7 
1973-75  0.9  1.4  -0.5  0.0  -0.3 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a.  The warranted  increase of real wages is that increase for which factor shares remain constant, as de- 
scribed in the text. 
b.  For 1969-73, trend productivity is measured as the average of the actual growth of productivity in 
1962-73; for 1973-75, it is the average of the actual growth in 1973-78. 
c.  Measured as the ratio of the deflator for gross domestic product at market prices to  the consumer 
price index. 
d. Measured as the ratio of the deflator for gross domestic product at factor cost to  that deflator at 
market prices. 
ularly  large  cut in excise  and sales taxes in Canada  in late 1974  illustrates 
this point. 
In the European  countries  and Japan  the actual  growth  of real wages 
did slow along with the warranted  rate, but it continued  to exceed the 
warranted  rate and hence to shift factor shares toward labor. In the Jeffrey  D. Sachs  285 
United States the slowdown  was more than sufficient  to preserve  factor 
shares,  while  in Canada  the warranted  rate  of growth  of real  wages  rose  in 
1973-75 and was essentially  matched  by the actual  rate.  As tables  3 and 
4 indicate,  the result of the persistence  in the growth  of real wages was 
another  substantial  increase  in labor's  share  and another  sharp  decline  in 
the rates  of return  to capital  in all countries  outside  North  America. 
WAGES  IN  1975-78 
The 1975-78 period  is a fascinating  one for wage developments.  It is 
clear that the high unemployment  of the "great  recession"  made a sub- 
stantial  contribution  to real  wage  moderation.  The data  of table 1 remove 
any notion  that  strong  trade  unions  have effectively  controlled  real  wages 
in recent  years.  Although  labor's  share  averaged  higher  in 1975-78 than 
in 1973-75 in most countries  (table 3), that shift in income distribution 
was halted or partially  reversed  by the end of the period. In the United 
Kingdom  the drop in labor's share from 0.80 in 1975 to 0.74 in 1977 
testifies  to the initial  success  of the Labour  government9s  incomes  policy. 
But another  burst  of wage increases  in 1978 dulled  both that  success  and 
much  of the gain  in profitability;  labor's  share  increased  to 0.78 in 1978. 
In Germany  the share  of labor  for the entire  economy  fell below its 1970 
level in 1978, while within  the manufacturing  sector, the profit  squeeze 
continued.  In Japan  the growth  of real wages  in manufacturing  declined 
extraordinarily  from 8 percent  a year  in the 1962-73 period  to 1 percent 
during  1975-78. But an equally  sharp  decline  in productivity  growth  pre- 
vented  a significant  increase  in profit  margins  until 1978. 
I have more to say in the final section about how the moderation  in 
real  wages  was  achieved. 
The  Linkage  of Real  Wages  to Output  and  Employment 
The behavior  of real  wages  in the  industrialized  economies  in the 1970s 
has had a significant  effect  on output,  employment,  and capacity  growth. 
High real  wages  and  low profitability  spurred  the austere  macroeconomic 
policies outside  North America  after 1974. Moreover,  they contributed 
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Understandably,  macroeconomists  have  tended  to  ignore  the  role  of 
real  wages  in  the  short-run  determination  of  output  and  employment. 
Modern  disequilibrium  analysis  in  macroeconomics  shows  persuasively 
that the real wage  often  plays  no role in output  determination.  To  be pre- 
cise,  real wages  importantly  determine  the notional  output  supply  of firms 
-that  is, the desired  output  that would  emerge  if firms were  not  rationed 
in their factor  or output  markets.  But  under  the  "typical"  Keynesian  cir- 
cumstance  in which  firms are rationed  in output  markets,  actual  output  is 
determined  by demand  rather than by notional  supply. 
In his recent  insightful  discussion  of disequilibrium  economics,  Malin- 
vaud  suggests  reasons  why  the  demand-constrained  equilibria  of  firms 
will  be  normal  in  advanced  economies.  He  also  outlines  circumstances 
that will  lead  to classical  unemployment,  the  situation  in which  firms are 
producing  their  notional  supply  and the real  wage  is too  high  for full  em- 
ployment.  The  spirit of his theoretical  discussion  pervades  this paper: 
Among the many conceivable combinations  of events, the one most favour- 
able to classical  unemployment  occurs when there is a sudden  decrease  in the 
quantity  of final output per unit of labour, and when anticipations  or social 
tensions  lead to an abnormal  increase  in real wages. 
One may argue that such a situation  built up progressively  in the late sixties 
and early seventies in the Western  world. It may be considered  as partly re- 
sponsible  for the rather  substantial  level of unemployment  that remained  dur- 
ing the 1972-3 boom. It was still an important  part of the picture  during  the 
1975 sharp depression.  There is serious risk that it will prevail again in the 
future,  once the slack of aggregate  demand  has disappeared.17 
There  are imposing  technical  difficulties  in testing  for  classical  versus 
Keynesian  unemployment  in  a particular  episode.  Even  within  the  sim- 
plest  disequilibrium  framework  in  which  identical  firms  are  either  all 
demand-rationed  or  all  producing  notional  supply,  it  is  difficult  to  per- 
form  econometric  tests  to  distinguish  the  two  cases.  At  a minimum,  both 
notional  demand  and  notional  supply  equations  must  be posited  and sta- 
tistically  identified.'8  A major complication  is introduced  when  the ration- 
ing  occurs  only  in some  markets,  but  not  others,  so that  there  is a mix  of 
17. E. Malinvaud, The Theory of Unemployment Reconsidered (Wiley, 1977), 
pp. 107-08. 
18. For a good discussion of the econometrics of disequilibrium  estimation, see 
R. Bowden, The Econometrics  of Disequilibriuim,  Studies in Mathematical  and Man- 
agerial Economics, vol. 26 (Elsevier-North Holland, 1978). Jeffrey  D. Sachs  287 
the classical  and  Keynesian  cases.  Finally,  Malinvaud's  remarks  suggest  a 
logical difficulty.  Although the 1974-75 recession  probably  reflected  a 
demand-constrained  situation,  the high level of real wages  made  it likely 
that classical unemployment  would prevail  when demand  was restored. 
The fact that firms  were demand-constrained  in 1975 does not eliminate 
the concern  about  excessive  real  wages  during  the recovery  period. 
I do not offer a rigorous  econometric  test for classical  unemployment 
in the seventies.  Rather,  I argue  that the timing  of output  movements  in 
the sixties and seventies  strongly  points  to a role for real wages  in output 
determination  and capital  accumulation.  The slowdown  in the growth  of 
the manufacturing  sector  in the early seventies  and the failure  of econo- 
mies outside  North America  to recover  from the 1974-75 recession  are 
the central  facts that  I emphasize  in what  follows. To set the stage,  I turn 
briefly  to some  theoretical  issues. 
AGGREGATE  SUPPLY  IN  THE  OPEN  ECONOMY 
Real wages  affect  aggregate  supply  in the open economy  through  many 
channels.  In the short run, increases  in real wages may induce profit- 
maximizing  firms to reduce labor input, in order to equate the higher 
wage with a higher  marginal  product  of labor, or may cause inefficient 
firms  to shut down entirely.'9  In the longer run, higher  real wages and 
lower  profitability  reduce  investment  incentives  and  thus slow the growth 
of capacity.  This channel has been analyzed  in an insightful  paper by 
Kouri.20  To illustrate  these  channels  and  to describe  some  policy  dilemmas 
occurring  after  a boom in real  wages,  I introduce  a standard  model  of the 
small open economy.  Because the discussion  rather  closely follows the 
19. In his classic analysis, Houthakker showed that the case of  capital-labor 
substitution and the case of shutdowns may be indistinguishable  in aggregate data. 
Specifically, a value-added supply function on the industry or sectoral level  can 
emerge through aggregation  over firms with fixed proportions  in the short run and 
different capital-labor ratios. The higher wage reduces employment through the 
exit  of  firms  (or  smaller production units),  rather than  through capital-labor 
substitution.  See H. S. Houthakker,  "The Pareto Distribution and the Cobb-Douglas 
Production Function in Activity Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 23, 
no. 1 (1955),pp.27-31. 
20.  Pentti J. K. Kouri, "Profitability  and Growth in a Small Open Economy," in 
Assar Lindbeck, ed., Inflation and Unemployment in Open Economies, Studies in 
International Economics, vol. 5  (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979), pp. 129-42. 288  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
work in Brecher,  Helpman,  R0dseth, and others, I avoid mathematical 
derivations  in this discussion.21 
Consider  an economy  that  produces  home  goods (private  nontradable 
goods), tradable  goods (exportable  and import-competing  goods), and 
government  services.  The tradable-goods  sector faces a perfectly  elastic 
demand  for its product  at the world  price,  which  is given as 
(2)  PQT =  PQ*T-*  E, 
where  PQT  and PQT  are, respectively,  the domestic and "world"  prices 
of tradable  goods, and E is the exchange  rate in units of domestic  cur- 
rency  per unit of world  currency. 
Assuming  that government  services are not directly  purchased,  the 
consumer  price level may be written  as an index of the prices of home 
goods,  H, and  tradable  goods, T, 
(3)  PC =  PQHPQFT, 
where  X  is the  weight  of the home  goods  in the  consumption  market  basket. 
I ignore  the intermediate  goods and indirect  taxes, so that sectoral  out- 
put prices,  PQ,, equal the sectoral  value-added  deflator  Pv1, and output, 
Q  i, equals value-added, V . 
The unique  feature  of the model is the assumption  that the real wage, 
Wc,  is exogenous,  perhaps  fixed  by powerful  unions  or social  custom.  The 
real wage, Wc, is a weighted  geometric  average  of the sectoral  product 
wages. Because Wc =  W/PC, and Pvi = PQ,,  from equation 3: 
(4)  WC  =  (W/PVH)X(W/PVT)(  )  . 
At a given  real  wage,  a decrease  in the product  wage  in one sector  must  be 
21.  See Richard A.  Brecher, "Minimum Wage Rates and the Pure Theory of 
International  Trade," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.  88  (February 1974), 
pp. 98-116; Elhanan Helpman, "Macroeconomic  Policy in a Model of International 
Trade  with a Wage Restriction,"  International  Economic Review, vol. 17 (June 1976), 
pp. 262-77; and Asbj0rn R0dseth, "Macroeconomic  Policy in a Small Open Econ- 
omy," Scandinavian  Journal of Economics, vol. 81, no. 1 (1979),  pp. 48-59.  More 
recent one-sector models of the linkage between real wages and output in the open 
economy include Franco Modigliani and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The Manage- 
ment of an Open Economy with "100% Plus" Wage Indexation, Essays in Inter- 
national Finance, 130  (Princeton University, Department of  Economics,  1978); 
Jacques R. Dreze and Franco Modigliani, "The Trade-off between Real Wages and 
Employment in an Open Economy (Belgium)"  (Massachusetts Institute of  Tech- 
nology, Department  of Economics, n.d.);  and Jeffrey Sachs, "Wages, Flexible Ex- 
change Rates, and Macroeconomic  Policy," Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 94 
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matched  by an increase  in the product  wage in the other sector. This is 
important  because  the desired  level of output  by firms  in each sector  is a 
negative  function  of the sectoral  product  wage. 
If firms are not rationed  in the output or labor market,  the profit- 
maximizing  supply  for price-taking  firms  requires  that  the marginal  prod- 
uct of labor equal the product  wage. For a fixed capital stock, Ki, and 
with  the conventional  assumption  of a value-added  function,  V, (K,, Li), 
that is linear homogeneous  and well-behaved,  desired  labor inputs and 
desired  output,  V8,  will be a decreasing  function  of the product  wage, 
(5)  Vil  =  V1j(W1Pvj)&Z  V8'"  <  O. 
When  firms  are  rationed  in the output  market,  actual Vi will be less than 
Vt.  In general,  Vi <  VF(W/Pvj)Kj,  with the strict  inequality  holding  in the 
Keynesian  case.  Experimenting  with standard  production  functions  shows 
that  the  elasticity  of VI  with  respect  to W/Pvi  can  be quite  large.  For a pro- 
duction  function  that  has constant  elasticity  of substitution,  o-,  and a labor 
share,  a, the output  elasticity  is given by ao/(l  -  a), which  might easily 
exceed 2.0.22 
Using equation  4 and the negative  relationship  between  sectoral  prod- 
uct wages  and  output  in 5, a downward-sloping  supply  schedule,  S, can  be 
derived  for a given capital  stock, as shown in the diagram.  For a given 
real  wage,  Wc,  an  increase  in notional  output  in one sector  must  be accom- 
panied  by a decrease  in the other.  A rise in Wc  shifts  the entire  schedule 
to S', closer  to the origin.  If firms  are not rationed  in the output  market, 
production  will take place along the S schedule (or S' schedule), at a 
point  like A. With  Keynesian  unemployment,  actual  production  might  be 
inside the S schedule,  at a point like A'. It is clear that the price ratio, 
PVH/PVT, increases as one moves up from point A  to point B on the S 
schedule.23 
22. Note that a short-run elasticity of output of 2.0 for wages is not observed 
because firms are not always, and perhaps not typically, on their notional supply 
schedules. 
23. As one moves up S, the product wage in the home sector declines, although 
the real wage is given. From 
W  W{  Pc  d  APVT  1X 
PVH  VPC  JPVH  J  PCJPVHJ 
it follows that 
PVH  /W  1(-  /W\1(- 
VVT  rPVHa 
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VI, 
~~~~~~~VT 
The essence  of the argument  about classical  unemployment  is that de- 
mand  management  can, at most, move the private  economy  up to the S 
schedule,  or along  it, if the  real  wage  is at Wc.  If the real  wage  rises  to Wc, 
the best that can be achieved  is a point along  the S' schedule.  To get pro- 
duction  back onto S, real wages  must decline  or else the capital  stock or 
technical  productivity  must increase. 
Four  points  should  be made  at the outset  about  the S schedule.  First,  it 
represents  output  (or employment)  in the  private  sector.  Full employ- 
ment can always  be insured  if the government  sector  expands  enough  to 
absorb  the unemnployed.  This idea is the core of a model of endogenous 
growth of the government  sector by Sdderstr5m  and Viotti.24 Second, 
movements  along  the S schedule  involve trading  off growth  of one sector 
for contraction  in another.  Helpman and, implicitly,  R0dseth demon- 
strate  that expansion  of the home sector at the expense  of the tradable 
goods sector  will provide  a net increase  in total employment  in the likely 
case that  the home sector  is labor-intensive.25  Third,  if the economy  has a 
24.  See Hans Tson Sbderstrbm  and Staffan Viotti, "Money Wage Disturbances 
and the Endogeneity  of the Public Sector in an Open Economy," in Lindbeck, ed., 
Inflation  and Employment,  pp. 71-98. 
25. See Helpman, "Macroeconomic  Policy in a Model of International  Trade," 
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small role in world trade, so that its exporting  firms  face unlimited  de- 
mands  on the world  market,  government  purchases  of the tradable  good 
have no effect  on aggregate  demand  and simply  show up one-for-one  in 
the trade  deficit.  And fourth,  expansionary  demand  policies will tend to 
raise  prices  of home  goods  relative  to those  of tradable  goods  because  the 
latter  are fixed  on the world market.  Whether  the fiscal expansion  is an 
increase  in government  employment,  which  raises  income  and  demand  for 
VH, an income  tax cut, or a direct  government  purchase  of V,, the effect 
is likely  to be a movement  upward  along the S schedule,  as from  A to B. 
The S schedule and the conditions  of aggregate  demand determine 
short-run  equilibrium  of output, employment,  and relative  prices. The 
position  of the S schedule  is a function  of real  wages,  technology,  and  the 
capital  stock  in each sector.  The long-run  growth  of aggregate  supply  de- 
pends  fundamentally  on capital  accumulation,  and  high  real  wages  can be 
an important  disincentive.  Previous theoretical  work has explored the 
linkage  of real  wages  to investment;  and  the main  conclusions  of that  work 
can  be briefly  summarized. 
The negative  relationship  between  wages  and  capital  accumulation  fol- 
lows from the factor-price  frontier.  Consider  investment  in the tradable 
goods sector, where the good is used for investment  as well as for con- 
sumption. With production following a relationship VT =  VT(LT,KT), the 
factor-price  frontier  defines  a negative  relationship  between  0VT/OKT  and 
OVT/&LT, the marginal  products  of capital and labor. For competitive 
firms,  aVT/OLT  =  W/PVT (in the absence  of demand  constraints).  Thus 
there  is a negative  relationship  between  the d  VT/OKT  and W/PVT  terms.26 
Most investment  theories  (in effect) make  investment  demand  a function 
26.  By linear homogeneity, the value-added function can be written in intensive 
form as 
.VT =f({) 
LT  VLTJ 
Then 
OVT  _f(KT/LT) 
OKT  O(KT/LT) 
so that a VTI/KT  is implicitly  a function of KT/LT. Similarly, 
9VT  f  YV  KT 
OLT  OKT LT' 
so that aVT/aLT  is also a function of KT/LT. It is thus possible  to write  aVT/OKT  as an 
implicit  (decreasing)  function of a VT/OLT.  For WIPVT =  aVTI/LT,  one can obtain 
KVT  h  W  h' < 0. 
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of the difference  between  OVT/OKT  and the cost of capital.  If the small 
economy  takes  the  world  cost  of capital,  i*, as given,  an  increase  in W/PVT 
lowers  a  VT/OKT  relative  to i*, and  investment  falls. Pentti  Kouri  has  used 
this framework  to show how a boom in real wages tends to slow capital 
accumulation.  When  his model  is extended  to allow  for efficient  operation 
of  asset markets with rational expectations, similar conclusions are 
reached.27 
These  tools can  describe  the results  of a boom  in real  wages.  In the dia- 
gram,  the initial  effect  is to shift  the frontier  from  S to S', and  the economy 
moves  from  a point  like  A to a point  on S' or to one inside  S', like C. If the 
government  tries  to maintain  full employment,  the shift  to C will induce  a 
fiscal  expansion.  In the event of an increase  in government  employment, 
the economy  is pushed  onto the S' schedule,  but with an increase  in the 
relative  price  of the home  good. The equilibrium  is at point  D.28 
The expansionary  policy imposes  some cost. For given W/PC,  the ex- 
pansion raises PVH/PVT and thus W/PVT. As a result, output in the trad- 
able  goods  sector  is likely  to decline  in the short  run,  as is capital  accumu- 
lation in that sector. Finally, by ratifying  the boom in real wages, the 
authorities  forgo the chance  that growth  in real wages  will be moderated 
by unemployment  following  the initial  shock. 
OUTPUT  AND  INVESTMENT  IN  1969-73 
The supply-side  theory  outlined  above  is strongly  supported  by the data 
on output  behavior.  Table 6 shows the growth  rates  of output  for manu- 
facturing,  private  nonmanufacturing,  government  services,  and aggregate 
GDP for the seven large economies.  The dominant  fact after the wage 
boom is a slowdown  in the growth  of manufacturing  output,  which  is tied 
to the profit  squeeze  in that sector  at the beginning  of the 1970s. In every 
country  except  France,  the share  of labor  compensation  in manufacturing 
rose in 1969-73 (beginning  in 1967 in Canada) as shown  in table 3; and 
the growth  of that  sector  slowed.  The profit  squeeze  was less severe  in the 
nonmanufacturing  sector,  and the growth  of output  in that sector  corre- 
27.  In a world of perfect capital mobility in which equity claims to domestic 
capital must earn a world rate of return, the wage boom causes an unambiguous 
decline in equity prices. With investment an increasing function of  equity prices 
relative to the replacement  cost of capital, the investment rate declines. 
28.  For details, see R0dseth,  "Macroeconomic  Policy." Jefrey D. Sachs  293 
Table  6. Rates  of Growth  of Real Value-Added  in Manufacturing,  Private 
Nonmanufacturing,  Government  Services,  and  the Aggregate  Economy,  by Country, 
Selected  Periods,  1963-78a 
Annual  average,  in percent 
Country  and  Private  Government  Aggregate 
period  Manufacturing nonmanuifacturing  services  economy 
Canada 
1963-69  7.1  5.3  5.6  5.7 
1969-73  5.0  6.5  3.9  5.7 
1973-75  -0.8  3.1  3.0  2.3 
1975-78  5.5  n.a.  n.a.  3.7 
France 
1963-69  6.6  5.4  3.0  5.4 
1969-73  6.5  5.6  3.4  5.6 
1973-75  0.1  1.9  2.5  1.2 
1975-78  4.5  n.a.  n.a.  3.9 
Germany 
1963-69  6.4  3.8  3.7  4.8 
1969-73  4.1  4.6  5.0  4.4 
1973-75  -2.7  -0.5  3.8  -1.0 
1975-78  3.8  n.a.  n.a.  3.9 
Italy 
1963-69  6.9  4.7  3.0  5.1 
1969-73  5.7  3.6  2.7  4.2 
1973-75  -1.7  n.a.  2.7  0.1 
1975-78  5.4  n.a.  n.a.  3.3 
Japan 
1963-69  14.1  n.a.  n.a.  10.8 
1969-73  9.8  n.a.  n.a.  9.2 
1973-75  -7.6  n.a.  n.a.  0.7 
1975-78  7.1  n.a.  n.a.  5.6 
United  lKingdom 
1963-69  4.2  2.9  1.7  2.8 
1969-73  2.8  3.7  2.4  3.6 
1973-75  -3.8  -1.1  2.9  -1.1 
1975-78  1.2  n.a.  n.a.  2.3 
United  States 
1963-69  5.4  4.2  4.1  4.5 
1969-73  3.2  4.0  0.8  3.4 
1973-75  -5.9  0.0  3.2  -1.2 
1975-78  7.3  n.a.  n.a.  5.0 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a.  The first year included is 1963 rather than 1962, as elsewhere in the paper, because 1962 data for the 
real value-added  of government  services were not readily available. 
n.a. Not available. 294  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
spondingly  displayed  a smaller  slowdown.  Indeed, in those countries- 
Canada,  France,  Germany,  and  the United  Kingdom-where the share  of 
labor compensation  in nonmanufacturing  did not rise in 1969-73, that 
sector expanded  sufficiently  to compensate  partially  or wholly for the 
slowdown  in manufacturing.  In Italy and the United  States,  with a rising 
labor's  share  in private  nonmanufacturing,  growth  in that sector  did not 
rise. Expansion  of employment  in the government  sector in the United 
Kingdom  and Germany  was also important  in maintaining  the growth  of 
aggregate  output,  as I describe  below. 
The 1969-73 slowdown  in manufacturing  offers a vivid view of the 
aggregate  supply  mechanism  because  the slowdown  was  clearly  not a cycli- 
cal phenomenon  associated  with any sustained  recession.  In most coun- 
tries, 1970 or 1971 was a recession  year, but 1972 was a recovery  year, 
and 1973 a boom year. As the table shows, real growth  in GDP during 
1969-73 compared  to 1963-69 is either faster or maintained  at about 
the same rate for Canada,  France, Germany,  and the United Kingdom. 
Clearly,  in Canada,  Germany,  and the United Kingdom  the manufactur- 
ing slowdown  reflects  a shift  of production  from  that  sector,  where  it had 
become  less profitable,  to other  sectors  where  the product  wage rose less 
steeply. 
Manufacturing  output  displays  a strong  inverse  relationship  to lagged 
product  wages  in simple  regression  equations.  This may seem surprising, 
since Bodkin and others have found no negative relationship  between 
output and real wages in U.S. data.29  However, more recently Otani 
demonstrated  such a negative  relationship,  often statistically  significant, 
for almost all West European  economies.80  I have estimated  simple re- 
gression  equations  relating  manufacturing  value-added  to lagged  product 
wages using annual  data for 1961-74, with both variables  measured  as 
percentage  deviations  from an exponential  trend.  The regressions  show a 
strong  link  in some  countries  between  high  product  wages  and  low output 
in the succeeding  year.  The coefficients  on wages  were (t-statistics  in abso- 
lute values  in parentheses):  Canada,  -1.18  (2.7); France,  -0.07  (0.5); 
29.  See Ronald G. Bodkin, "Real Wages and Cyclical Variations in Employ- 
ment: A Re-examination  of the Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 2 
(August 1969), pp. 353-74. 
30.  See Ichiro Otani, "Real Wages and Business Cycles Revisited," Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 60 (May 1978), pp. 301-04. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  295 
Germany,  -0.85  (2.1);  Italy,  -0.60  (2.8);  Japan,  -1.63  (3.1); 
United  Kingdom,  -0.63  (1.1);  United  States,  -0.02  (0.0).  For  the 
reason discussed earlier, the coefficients do not provide structural elas- 
ticities of  output with respect to wages:  the equations include periods 
of both Keynesian unemployment (when the coefficient should be near 
zero)  and classical unemployment. They do give the impression that the 
real wage was an important determinant of output in many countries out- 
side the United States during the 1961-74  period. 
An important reason why the manufacturing slowdown did not gen- 
erate a rise in aggregate unemployment in the United Kingdom and Ger- 
many is a compensating expansion of the public sector, which in effect 
ratified the wage explosion.  In their analysis of inflation in the United 
Kingdom in the 1970s,  Williamson and Wood make the argument that 
growth in the public sector was a response to macroeconomic conditions: 
It seems clear enough that wage increases,  rather than price increases,  were 
the initiating  factor in the intensification  of inflation [in 1970]: the contrary 
interpretation  is inconsistent  with the severe  squeeze  on profits  of recent years. 
. .  .In  the absence of major change in monetary-fiscal  policies or further 
shocks from abroad,  we would have expected the wage explosion to produce 
a rise in unemployment  to a level above the natural  rate....  Unemployment 
did indeed  rise, peaking  in the first  quarter  of 1972 [and]  when unemployment 
approached  the politically sensitive figure of  one million, the government 
promptly  embarked  on an extremely  expansionary  fiscal policy.31 
These  events  are recorded  in  table  7.  Note  that  the  recovery  of  the 
United Kingdom came with a sharp rise in PvHl/PvT in 1972, which I have 
argued is the mechanism for moving up along the S' schedule; and this 
further squeezed manufacturing. 
The pattern for Germany is quite similar. Following the wage explosion 
in  1970,  the economy  entered a recession in  1971,  with a recovery in 
1972.  The  OECD  attributed this  recession  substantially to  the  profit 
squeeze following  the  large  1970  and  1971  wage  settlements and the 
appreciation of  the  deutsche  mark.32 At  the  end  of  1971,  as  OECD 
notes, the government adopted the stance that "reflationary fiscal mea- 
sures would be taken if necessary to maintain a satisfactory level of activ- 
31. John Williamson and Geoffrey E. Wood, "The British Inflation: Indigenous 
or Imported?"  American Economic Review, vol. 66 (September 1976), pp. 525-28. 
32.  OECD Economic Outlook, no.  10  (Paris:  OECD, December  1971),  pp. 
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Table 7. Rates  of Growth  of Wages, Prices, Output,  and the Public  Sector  in Germany 
and the United  Kingdom,  Selected  Periods,  1962-73 
Annual  average,  in percent 
Country  anzd  measure  1962-69 1969-73  1970  1971  1972  1973 
United  Kingdom 
Real wage, manufacturing  2.9  4.3  6.4  4.3  4.8  1.7 
Value-added  deflator:  ratio 
of home goods to tradable 
goods  2.0  3.0  -1.4  0.6  4.5  8.8 
Real value-added  in 
manufacturing  4.1  2.7  0.4  -0.6  2.7  8.4 
Real value-added  of 
government  services  1.8  2.4  1.3  2.8  2.7  2.7 
Real government  expenditures  1.8  3.1  1.5  3.0  4.2  3.7 
Germany 
Real wage, manufacturing  5.1  7.9  11.9  7.5  6.0  6.3 
Value-added  deflator:  ratio 
of home goods to tradable 
goods  1.5  2.3  0.7  2.9  3.6  2.0 
Real value-added  in 
manufacturing  5.8  4.1  5.9  1.4  2.7  6.3 
Real value-added  of 
government  services  3.7  5.0  6.0  4.4  4.8  4.7 
Real government  expenditures  3.4  5.3  4.6  6.3  4.6  5.5 
Sources: See appendix A. 
ity."33  The fiscal package involved both a rapid expansion of the govern- 
ment sector and increased purchases of goods and services. As indicated 
in  table 7,  the government sector and fiscal purchases grew far more 
rapidly during 1969-73  than during 1962-69. 
The rapid increases of real wages in the late  1960s  and early 1970s 
apparently had strong effects on capital accumulation as well as output. 
A slowdown in capital accumulation at the beginning of this decade has 
been  discussed by  European  economists,  particularly those  associated 
with Herbert Giersch at the Institute for World Economics in Kiel, Ger- 
many. In a recent essay Giersch noted: 
The present  (1978/79)  situation  in West Germany  and in countries  of a simi- 
lar position is characterized  by a lack of investors'  confidence  notably in the 
33.  OECD Economnic  Outlook, no. 11 (Paris: OECD, July 1972), p. 45. Jeffrey D. Sachs  297 
Table 8. Rates  of Growth  of Net Capital  Stock in Manufacturing,  by Country, 
Selected  Periods,  1962-77 
Annual  average,  in percent 
Country  1962-70  1970-73  1973-77 
Canada  4.4  4.7  4.8 
France  6.4  8.3  7.5 
Germany  8.6  7.2  4.0 
Italy  5.1  4.7  3.9 
Japan  14.0  15.2a  9.3 
United Kingdom  4.3  3.8  2.3 
United States  2.7  2.7  2.8 
Source: Data provided by Jacques Artus, International Monetary Fund. 
a.  Although the rate of growth of the capital stock is very  large in 1970  and 1971, it falls in 1972  and 1973, 
to a 12.9 percent  annual rate. 
international  sector of the economy....  Between 1970 and 1971 and again 
after 1973 the international  sector of the West German economy has grown 
less than  would have been normal....  Over  the period 1961 to 1977, the [rate 
of growth  of gross  fixed investment]  for Germany  was only 2.2 percent,  exclu- 
sively due to the worse performance since 1971  [emphasis added].34 
In Germany, the share of  total  investment expenditure devoted  to the 
manufacturing sector fell sharply after 1970. After averaging 27 percent 
during 1962-70,  the share fell to 24 percent in 1972, and then to 22 per- 
cent in both 1973 and 1974.  Similarly, in the United Kingdom the share 
went from 25 percent during the  1962-70  period to 21 percent during 
1972-74.35 
Reliable estimates are not available of the capital stock for the seven 
countries in this study. Table  8 presents estimates by the International 
Monetary Fund  of  capital  accumulation in manufacturing.36  The  data 
34. Herbert Giersch, "Aspects of  Growth, Structural Change, and Employ- 
ment-A  Schumpeterian  Perspective,"  paper prepared  for the 1979 Kiel Conference 
on  Macroeconomic Policies for Growth and Stability (forthcoming in  Weltwirt- 
schaftliches  Archiv), pp. 24-25 in the typescript. 
35. These figures  were calculated from OECD national accounts statistics as the 
ratio of nominal gross fixed capital expenditure in manufacturing to that for  all 
industries. 
36. The data are described in Jacques R. Artus, "Measures  of Potential Output 
in Manufacturing  for Eight Countries, 1955-1978," International Monetary Fund, 
IMF Staff Papers, vol. 24 (March 1977), pp. 23-25.  I am skeptical of the precision 
of the data (in particular,  they do not show a deceleration in the U.S. capital stock 
in manufacturing  after 1970),  but they may offer some evidence for comparing 
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show deceleration in the manufacturing capital stock in Germany, Italy, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom after 1970,  and a contrasting sharp ac- 
celeration of the capital stock in France. France is the one economy that 
displays rising profitability and a stable share of  labor income  during 
1969-73. 
OUTPUT  AND  INVESTMENT  IN  1973-78 
The 1973-78  period began with another shift of the aggregate supply 
schedule toward the origin, this one initiated not by a wage explosion but 
by a productivity slowdown and a shift in the terms of trade. Because of a 
demand contraction resulting from macroeconomic policies and transfers 
to OPEC, significant Keynesian unemployment emerged on top of grow- 
ing classical unemployment. The unemployment was certainly Keynesian 
in the U.S. economy, where real wages moderated in line with the produc- 
tivity slowdown and the adverse shift in the terms of trade. In this episode, 
unlike the earlier case of the wage boom, policymakers in most countries 
did not ratify the profit squeeze through expansionary policy. The hope 
was eventually to restore the growth of the private sector by pushing down 
real wages relative to trend growth in productivity. 
Herbert Giersch  articulated this reasoning  in  his  discussion  of  the 
German recession: 
In these circumstances,  economic policy has two polar options to stimulate 
growth  and promote  employment: 
-lowering  unit labor  costs relative  to other countries  by restraining  real wage 
increases  and reducing  the double factoral terms of trade (Option I),  and 
-accelerating  growth of total factor productivity  by rejuvenating  the econ- 
omy and augmenting  the supply of highly productive  jobs (Option II) .37 
According to  a recent study, a similar view was behind the policies  of 
French authorities: 
Since 1974, France has continued  to give wage-earners  and protected  sectors 
an increasing  purchasing  power at rates more or less the same as in the pre- 
ceding period,  even though both production  and productivity  have fallen or 
stagnated.  The country's  economy was able to adapt ...  only through  ...  in- 
creased international  indebtedness,  a reduction in profits, a curb on invest- 
ment. ...  [The  Barre  Plan]  was drawn  up with the aim of preparing  a recovery 
on a healthier  financial  basis and the restoration  of companies'  profit  margins. 
37.  Giersch, "Aspects  of Growth, Structural  Change, and Emplovment,"  p. 29. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  299 
Recovery through  public spending  failed in 1975 because the necessary con- 
ditions  for investment  and consumption  growth  did not exist....  This explains 
the sudden change in government  policy and its somewhat  belated concentra- 
tion on a stricter  concept of economic management.38 
After  1973,  the  Keynesian  adjustment pattern became  apparent in 
North America.  Because real wages had little to do with the U.S.  and 
Canadian downturn, they could be ignored in the recovery. Labor's share 
of income in manufacturing and throughout the economy was virtually 
unchanged during 1973-78.  Profit rates barely fell, and according to a 
study by Feldstein and Summers, U.S. profitability actually rose during 
1974-76  when cyclically adjusted.39  The recovery in output in the United 
States was vigorous, as shown in table 6. Output growth during 1975-78 
was much higher than average, reflecting recovery from the 1975 cyclical 
trough. In Canada, the recovery was not as sustained, but the growth of 
manufacturing was still stronger than in Europe. Finally, in the North 
American  economies,  real  capital  accumulation recovered  after 1975. 
According to table 8, growth of the capital stock in manufacturing did not 
slow during the recession and recovery period.40 
The  OECD  pointed  directly to  profitability as a crucial element  of 
recovery in the United States after 1975: 
[A] smaller squeeze on profit margins  was reversed more rapidly and more 
completely  in the United States [and]  the restoration  of profit  margins  was es- 
sential to the investment  upswing needed to sustain the expansion  in its later 
stages. Though still relatively weak, this private non-residential  investment 
recovery  has been more apparent  in the United States than elsewhere.4' 
In a sense, the moderation in U.S. real wages led to expansion through 
both aggregate supply and demand channels. The increase in demand for 
investment goods was crucial for recovery, but so was the willingness of 
firms to supply the increased output at prevailing factor costs and output 
prices. 
38. See Alain Bienayme, "Incomes Policy in  France," Lloyds Bank Review, 
no. 128 (April 1978), pp. 45-46. 
39.  Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Summers, "Is the Rate of  Profit Falling?" 
BPEA, 1  :1977, pp. 211-27. 
40.  As mentioned above, these data probably understate the slowdown in U.S. 
capital accumulation during 1973-77,  though the basic conclusion that the slow- 
down was less pronounced  in North America than elsewhere has been confirmed  in 
many analyses. 
41.  OECD Economic Surveys: United States (Paris: OECD, July 1978), p. 10. 300  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
A strikingly  different  picture  is evident  in the economies  of Europe  and 
Japan. In those countries,  labor's share in manufacturing  rose steeply 
after 1973. As discussed  above,  growth  in real wages  began  to moderate 
only after 1975 in France, Germany,  and the United Kingdom.  Profit- 
ability  tumbled  throughout  Europe  and  Japan.  And in no country  outside 
North  America  has real  growth  since 1975 come close to earlier  averages 
in manufacturing  or the aggregate  economy.  Even more  remarkable  is the 
slowdown  in capital  accumulation  in manufacturing  during  1973-77, as 
shown  in table 8. 
Monetary  Policy  and Real Wages 
To this  point,  the description  of policy  responses  during  the 1970s has 
implicitly  assumed  that policymakers  regarded  real wages as given exog- 
enously-in  effect,  asking  what might  be accomplished  for a fixed posi- 
tion of the S schedule.  In fact, policies have been adopted-and,  more 
often,  hotly  debated-which were  designed  to induce  shifts  of the  S sched- 
ule. These include incomes policies that enforce wage moderation  and 
payroll  tax cuts that lower labor costs to the firm  while preserving  real 
take-home  pay  for workers.  Although  I have  cited  the  role of such  policies 
for various  periods  and countries,  a general  evaluation  of them  is beyond 
the  focus  of this  paper, 
On the other  hand,  I do want  to explore  the role of conventional  mone- 
tary policy in dealing  with the supply-side  problem  posed by high real 
wages  and  a profit  squeeze.  With  flexible  exchange  rates,  monetary  policy 
is a potent vehicle for altering  inflation  rates, and potentially  an impor- 
tant instrument  for combating  a profit  squeeze or supply shock. In the 
models of Gordon, Phelps, and Bruno and mine, the value of mone- 
tary  policy  depends  on its ability  to affect  real  wages  by altering  the price 
level.42  Yet, in the late 1970s, European  and Japanese  policymakers  re- 
jected  the view that expansionary  monetary  policy could ease their  profit 
42.  For a closed economy see Edmund S. Phelps, "Commodity-Supply  Shock 
and Full-Employment Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
vol. 10 (May 1978), pp. 206-21; and Robert J. Gordon, "Alternative  Responses of 
Policy to External  Supply Shocks,"  BPEA, 1:1975, pp. 183-204. For an open econ- 
omy see Bruno and Sachs, "Macro-economic  Adjustment  with Import Price Shocks"; 
Modigliani and Padoa-Schioppa,  "Management  of an Open Economy"; and Dreze 
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squeeze,  arguing  that  rapid  expansion  of the money  supply  is purely  infla- 
tionary,  and  has no effect  on output  or real  wages.  Contrary  to the advice 
of U.S. authorities,  they have not adopted  monetary  expansion  as an in- 
strument  for alleviating  their  problems. 
The uses of monetary  policy seem to depend  on the specific  character 
of national  wage-setting  institutions.  In countries  whose labor  market  in- 
stitutions  make  nominal  wages  sluggish  in the short  run,  monetary  expan- 
sion can contribute  to recovery  from  recession;  in countries  in which  real 
wages are set independently  of the price level, monetary  restraint  can 
curb  inflation,  with little effect on output  and profits.  The United States 
seems  to fall in the first  category.  Most other  OECD  economies  fall in the 
second. 
Consider  a one-time  increase  in the money supply  under  flexible  ex- 
change  rates.  For given  levels of sectoral  output,  nominal  interest  rates  in 
the domestic  economy  will tend to decline.  With  a high degree  of capital 
mobility,  any decline  in those rates  below world  levels will induce  an in- 
cipient  capital  outflow,  as home residents  seek to trade  domestic  for for- 
eign securities.  The exchange  rate will then depreciate  until the expected 
future  appreciation  equals  the interest  rate differential.  Regardless  of the 
current  level of employment,  that  depreciation  will have a strong  effect  on 
the price  level;  prices  of tradable  goods and  imports  will rise by approxi- 
mately  the extent  of depreciation.43  If nominal  wages are fixed,  prices  of 
tradable  goods  are  driven  up relative  to the wage  level, and  the production 
of those  goods  is stimulated.  The increased  income  generated  in that  sec- 
tor  will then  raise  the demand  for home  goods. 
If, however,  nominal  wages  respond  to higher  prices  so that  real  wages 
are  preserved,  domestic  wages  and  prices  will eventually  rise  in proportion 
to the original  increase  in the money  supply.  Profitability  in tradable  and 
home goods will return  to initial levels; no output  effect  will occur. The 
contrasting  cases  show  that,  with  sluggish  nominal  wages,  monetary  policy 
can affect  output;  with rigid  real  wages,  monetary  policy works  on prices. 
Thus,  in the latter  case, monetary  contraction  is a powerful  tool for con- 
trolling  inflation. 
43. For a detailed theoretical analysis of  the linkages among exchange rates, 
prices, and wages see Sachs, "Wages,  Flexible Exchange Rates, and Macro-economic 
Policy." The empirical evidence for the connection between exchange rates and 
prices is discussed in Rudiger Dornbusch and Paul Krugman, "Flexible Exchange 
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It is often argued that, whenever the monetary authority can influence 
output and employment, it must do so by "tricking" the private sector. 
Why, after all, should a change in a nominal price, like a depreciation of 
the exchange rate, affect a real variable such as employment in the trad- 
able-goods sector? Keynes offered a plausible explanation in the General 
Theory, which has been  significantly enhanced in recent writings. For 
Keynes, it is the concerns of workers for relative rather than real wages 
that leads to sluggishness of nominal wages in decentralized labor mar- 
kets. In periods of unemployment, workers might be willing to accept a 
decline (or deceleration) in real wages, but not a decline relative to other 
workers. The absence of the Walrasian auctioneer becomes paramount 
because no group will initiate a deceleration of  nominal wages that all 
workers would accept. Fellner adapted Keynes' argument to open econ- 
omies.44  He argued that workers may accept reductions in real wages more 
readily if they are engineered by currency depreciation than by nominal 
wage cuts, because the former leads to uniform reductions in real wages, 
while the latter need not. 
More recently analysts have offered institutional reasons in support of 
Keynes' argument that the monetary authority is more effective than the 
private market in achieving a deceleration of real wages. Costs of bargain- 
ing, labor laws, difficulty in processing macroeconomic data, and other 
factors cause agents to enter into contracts without many contingencies 
for macroeconomic shocks. Stanley Fischer writes: 
The costs that prevent  the private sector insulating  itself from aggregate  dis- 
turbances  lead also to temporarily  sticky prices that produce  the presumption 
that private sector output is not continuously optimal. Those costs are the 
underlying  reason there is a potential role for activist monetary policy in 
attempting  to offset aggregate  disturbances.45 
Thus certain institutions of the labor market, such as long-term contracts 
and wage indexation, should be expected to influence the degree of slug- 
gishness of nominal wages in the short run. And they will therefore con- 
dition the role of monetary policy. For the purpose at hand, it is impor- 
tant that these institutions differ markedly across countries, as a result of 
44.  William Fellner, "Controlled Floating and the Confused Issue of  Money 
Illusion," Banca Nazionale  del  Lavoro Quarterly Review,  no.  106  (September 
1973), pp. 206-34  (American Enterprise  Institute Reprint 22). 
45.  Stanley Fischer, "On Activist Monetary Policy with Rational Expectations," 
in Fisher, ed., Rational Expectations and Economic Policy (University of Chicago 
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long-term  historical  developments.  So, too, should  the role of monetary 
policy. 
Some  international  differences  in wage setting  are  described  in appen- 
dix B. There  I summarize  the major  aspects  of timing  in the United  States 
and abroad  and focus on the organized  sector  for which there  is explicit 
information  about  wage-setting  procedures.  The timing  in the organized 
sector has a strong  influence  on the nonorganized  sector. Government 
wages  are  often patterned  on contractual  union  wages,  and  nonunionized 
workers  in union  firms  typically  receive  compensation  in line with nego- 
tiated  union  settlements.  According  to the table,  in only the United  States 
and Canada  are union sectors characterized  by long-term,  overlapping 
agreements,  with low levels of wage indexation.  The normal  length of 
contracts  in France,  Germany,  Japan,  and the United Kingdom  is about 
one year.  Although  these  countries  do not share  the fully centralized  bar- 
gaining  systems  of the Scandinavian  economies,  there  is moderate  to high 
synchronization  of contract negotiations  in Germany  and Japan, and 
somewhat  lower synchronization  in France  and the United Kingdom.  In 
Japan plant-level  bargaining  is effectively  synchronized  in the "spring 
wage offensive"  (shunto). In the United Kingdom  labor agreements  are 
often  written  without  fixed  duration.  The agreements  are  not legally  bind- 
ing and are typically  subject  to reopening  at the request  of one of the 
parties.  Only  under  the Industrial  Relations  Act (1971-74)  was there  an 
attempt  to institute  legally  binding  agreements  with obligations  to main- 
tain  industrial  peace  for a fixed  contract  period.  Under  the recent  incomes 
policy (1976-77),  the Trade  Union  Congress  agreed  to the twelve-month 
rule, forbidding  two contract  reopenings  during  a twelve-month  period. 
Besides  Canada  and the United  States,  only Italy has long-term  agree- 
ments.  But in Italy the three-year  bargaining  cycle is basically  synchro- 
nized,  and extensive  wage indexation  (the scala mobile) allows  for rapid 
responses  of wages  to changes  in the  price  level during  the  contract  period. 
The coverage  of employees  under  the scala mobile  is nearly  universal  in 
the industrial  sector (including  nonunion  workers),  though  the degree  of 
protection  of real wages offered  by the indexing  rules  has varied  widely. 
By 1975, the elasticity  of wage  change  with  respect  to price  change  under 
the index  had declined  to about  0.5. An overhaul  of the indexing  scheme 
in 1975 restored  the degree  of indexation  to more than 1.0. By 1978, it 
had declined  again  to approximately  0.85. 
The  example  of Germany  provides  the clearest  case of how  centralized, ..  *  *  *  *  *  ~c  t-  \0  \ 
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synchronized, and short-term contracts alter the role of monetary policy 
from fighting a profit squeeze to fighting inflation. From 1970  to  1973, 
annual inflation rates climbed in Germany from 3.3 percent to 6.9 per- 
cent. Contrary to popular belief, the German economy showed no special 
immunity to inflation. The Bundesbank pursued a contractionary mone- 
tary policy after the breakdown in March 1973 of the Smithsonian agree- 
ment of December 1971, with growth of the money stock declining from 
15.4 percent in 1972 to  11.4 percent in 1973  and 9.5  percent in 1974. 
Following  that tightening of money, the German exchange rate appre- 
ciated sharply in  1973  and  1974.  Although  import and export prices 
showed a one-time jump after the oil price shock, the rate of inflation of 
consumer prices declined during the course of 1974, as shown in table 9. 
At the beginning of  1974,  some relaxation of Bundesbank policy was 
expected in light of the prospect of recession. Inflation was "widely ex- 
pected to accelerate to at least 10 per cent, [and] average contractual wage 
increases reached about 14 per cent."46  But, according to OECD, 
In pursuance  of the agreed monetary policy targets, but contrary to wide- 
spread  expectations,  the Bundesbank  did not accommodate  the higher  nominal 
wage increases  by an easing of credit conditions.  Consequently,  businessmen 
were on average  unable  to fully pass on cost increases  resulting  from the high 
wage settlements  and the upsurge  in raw materials  prices. The tight monetary 
situation  produced  an unexpected moderation  in price inflation during 1974 
[actual  inflation  of the consumer  price index was 7 percent],  to which business 
responded  by cutting  both investment  and employment.47 
Since wage contracts were fixed for  1974,  the large nominal increases 
swelled real wages, with real compensation per hour climbing by 7.1 per- 
cent, after a 6.0 percent increase in 1973. 
Now the annual wage round enters the story. Late in 1974,  the con- 
certed action meetings took place, with government, union, and employer 
representatives  present. The meetings are not designed to formulate an in- 
comes policy, but rather to enforce a "concertation of expectations," so 
46. This quotation, and much of the subsequent discussion, is found in OECD 
Economic Surveys: Germany (Paris:  OECD, July  1975),  p.  7.  Herbert Giersch 
offers a nearly identical story in American Enterprise  Institute, A Disculssion  with 
Herbert Giersch: Current Problems of  thze  West German Economy, 1976-1977, 
AEI Studies, 147 (AEI, 1977). 
47.  OECD Economic Suirveys:  Germany, p. 7. The OECD points out that the 
overexpectation  of inflation was not merely due to failure to believe the monetary 
authorities.  Rather, shifts in fiscal policy at the end of  1973 gave an indication of a 
more expansionary  response to the developing recession. 306  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity,  2:1979 
that the implications of governmental policy as well as private action for 
the macroeconomy are clearly understood by all parties. The Bundesbank 
warned that the low targets for monetary aggregates would be maintained 
throughout 1975, and that substantial unemployment would result unless 
nominal wage increases were sharply cut. In the words of OECD,  "This 
message was taken seriously by employers and unions as wage increases 
fell drastically compared to the preceding round."48 
In all major industries the increase in contractual wages plummeted 
in  a  matter of  months.  Each  sector  had  a  new  bargaining round, so 
that no long-term contracts caused carry-overs from 1974. The last four 
rows of table 9 illustrate the deceleration in wages. This is how Germany 
became a country with low inflation by 1975. The sharp appreciation of 
the mark resulted in only a temporary boom in real wages  (which was 
relieved-although  not adequately relieved-by  1975),  so that the tight 
monetary policy had only a modest effect on profits and real activity. In 
other words, tight monetary policy did not exacerbate the profit squeeze. 
And the converse is also probably true: an expansionary monetary policy, 
announced at the concerted action meetings, would not have eased the 
profit squeeze. Giersch's observation is relevant: 
Inflation  in Germany  would have much less chance [than  in the United States], 
if any, of depressing  real wage increases  below the rise in distributable  pro- 
ductivity  . ..  for more than a year, given the inflation  sensitivity  of the popu- 
lation and the annual  nation-wide  wage rounds.  Prospects  for a long wage lag 
in Germany  have deteriorated  in comparison to the 1960s when the great 
post-1967  expansion,  supported  by longer  wage contracts,  ended in a series of 
wild cat strikes  in the fall of 1969.49 
Given  the  institutional  setting,  stimulative  monetary policy  is  neither 
needed nor able to moderate the growth of real wages. 
In the United States, on the other hand, nominal price developments 
importantly affect the real wage.  The  rise in commodity prices during 
1972-74  led to a reduction in real wages because nominal wages were 
largely tied to decisions made before the price spurt. The inflation was an 
efficient way to bring about the needed decline in real wages after the 
relative increase in the prices of primary goods. Since 1978, another jump 
in inflation-iniduced  in part by the depreciation of  the U.S.  dollar- 
again has led to a significant slowdown in the growth of real wages. The 
48.  Ibid.,  p. 8. 
49.  Giersch, "Aspects of Growth, Structural  Change, and Employment,"  p. 30. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  307 
pattern  is illustrated  in figure  1: whenever  current  price  inflation  exceeds 
lagged wage inflation,  the real wage change  is typically  negative.  This is 
because  the current  changes  in nominal  wages  are  strongly  linked  to their 
own past value through  the existence  of long-term,  overlapping  contracts. 
ECONOMETRIC  EVIDENCE  ON  WAGES 
A rigorous  econometric  test of short-run  stickiness  in nominal  wages 
is a forbidding  task.50  The  impact  of long-term  contracts  is to make  today's 
wage  level a complicated  function  of price-level  expectations  formed  over 
many  periods.  That  requires  the estimate  of a lag structure  for a variable 
that is itself notoriously  difficult  to measure.  And as Griliches  forcefully 
pointed  out many  years  ago, even very  precise  econometric  estimates  re- 
veal little about  the lag structure  of explanatory  variables.5'  With  this dis- 
claimer,  I believe there is indirect  econometric  evidence  to support  the 
view  of differential  wage  adjustment  in the major  countries. 
The simplest  way to model unindexed  long-term  contracts  is to regard 
them  as inducing  a lagged  adjustment  of nominal  wages  to current  market 
conditions.  Suppose,  for example,  that  new  wage  contracts  are  determined 
according  to a Phillips  curve  relationship,  making  the increase  in nominal 
wages a function  of unemployment,  U, and expected  inflation,  pe,  The 
existence  of old contracts  leads to a partial  adjustment  of average  wage 
inflation  to the rate  set in new contracts,  which  can be expressed  as 
(6)  w  -  w  =1  =  Oy(wn  -  w_1) 
(6A)  Vn =  pe  +  U_1 
where  wvS  is percentage  change in nominal  wages in new contracts,  and 
w is average  change  in all contracts.  With  no long-term  contracts,  y =  1; 
50. Certainly the  most  sophisticated attempt to  link  wage  contracting with 
econometric wage equations is in John B. Taylor, "An Econometric Business Cycle 
Model with Rational Expectations: Some Estimation Results" (Columbia Univer- 
sity, Department of Economics, June 1979). As a methodological investigation of 
certain time-series models, the paper is fascinating; as an empirical study, it is not 
completely successful. The demands of mathematical rigor lead the author to un- 
realistic assumptions of smoothness in the length and dating of  contracts, though 
contracts are at the center of the model. It is unfortunate that conflicting demands 
of mathematical  tractability  and institutional detail are present in any investigation 
of wage-setting  institutions. 
51.  See the discussion of  confidence intervals around distributed lags in  Zvi 
Griliches, "Distributed  Lags: A  Survey," Econometrica, vol.  35  (January 1967), 
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the more  prevalent  are long-term  contracts,  the closer  y is to zero. Using 
equations  6 and 6A, expected change in real wages can be written as 
(7)  w  -  pe  =  'yqU  1 -  (1 -  y)(pe  -  W_l). 
With y <  1, real wages can be altered  by anticipated  monetary  policy, 
which affects pe. 
Using the form  w =  8+B  +  +  /32pe  +  P3w l, I estimated  7 for the 
seven economies. Rather than simply constraining p2 +  PI to  1, as sug- 
gested by 6 and 6A, the equations  were estimated  in both the uncon- 
strained  and constrained  form,  and  the restriction  was tested.  The specifi- 
cation of pe  is difficult.  To form  pe,  I adopt  the procedure  recommended 
by Sargent.52  Let E(pIl1,) represent  the expectation  of today's  price  infla- 
tion conditional  on the information  set, I, at time t -  1. Assume  that the 
conditional  expectation  is a linear  function  of variables,  X,  known  at time 
t -  1 and earlier,  including  lagged wages, prices, unemployment,  and 
money supply:  E(plI  l)  =  fX-_.  The expectations  of price inflation  are 
taken  as the fitted  values  from a regression  equation  of inflation  on X-, It 
is important  in further  work  to try alternative  estimates  of pe. Better  data 
on expectations  are probably  available  from sources  for individual  coun- 
tries. 
Table 10 presents  equations  for the seven countries  with and with- 
out lagged wages. This set of equations  uses the (expected) consumer 
price  index as the price variable,  though  there  is almost  no change  if the 
GDP deflator  is used instead.  The effect of changes  in lagged  wages on 
current  wage  inflation  is remarkable  in the United  States.  The sum of co- 
efficients  on lagged  wages and current  price expectations  is near 1.0, but 
the coefficient  on price  expectations  is four  standard  errors  away  from 1.0. 
Clearly  the growth  of real wages in the United States  declines  when ex- 
pected  inflation  accelerates  and rises  when  expected  inflation  decelerates. 
This result  is apparently  not due to the source  of the inflation  (that is, an 
external  versus  an internal  shock); the lagged-wage  effect  is as strong  us- 
ing the GDP deflator  as the price  variable.  (These results  are  not shown.) 
Because  the coefficient  on the lagged  unemployment  variable  has only a 
small  influence  in the United States,  this is a simple  picture  of real wage 
dynamics.  The slowdown  in real wage growth  in 1973-74 is caused  by 
the speedup  of price inflation;  the subsequent  recovery of real wages 
52. Thomas J. Sargent,  "Rational  Expectations,  the Real Rate of Interest,  and the 
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Table  10. Estimated  Wage  Equations  for Major  OECD Countries,  1963-78a 
Independent  variable  Summary  statistic 
Labor  Lagged  Standard 
market  Expected  change  error  of 
Country  variable  inflation  in wages  J,2  Rho  estimate 
Canada  0.74  0.83  ...  0.87  -0.21  0.01 
(1.8)  (3.3)  (-0.6) 
0.44  0.79  0.18  0.87  -0.35  0.01 
(1.0)  (3.2)  (1.0)  (-1.0) 
France  1.04  1.35  ...  0.56  -0.32  0.03 
(1.7)  (6.1)  (-1.2) 
1.04  1.36  -0.00  0.52  -0.32  0.03 
(1.5)  (2.5)  (-0.0)  (-1.1) 
Germany  0.50  0.88  ...  0.31  0.14  0.03 
(1.7)  (1.6)  (0.4) 
0.61  0.93  -0.19  0.27  0.30  0.03 
(1.7)  (1.2)  (-0.3)  (0.6) 
Italy  0.92  0.85  ...  0.45  0.01  0.05 
(2.0)  (3.1)  (0.0) 
0.92  0.98  -0.14  0.41  0.08  0.05 
(1.8)  (1.7)  (-0.3)  (0.2) 
Japan  1.82  0.72  ...  0.75  0.47  0.03 
(2.5)  (1.9)  (1.0) 
1.84  0.82  0.16  0.74  0.11  0.03 
(3.2)  (1.9)  (0.9)  (0.2) 
United Kingdom  1.09  1.22  ...  0.79  -0.48  0.03 
(2.5)  (9.8)  (-1.5) 
0.90  1.40  -0.20  0.78  -0.52  0.03 
(1.8)  (6.1)  (-0.9)  (-1.7) 
United States  -0.18  0.11  ...  0.82  -0.35  0.01 
(-1.0)  (10.4)  (-1.0) 
0.14  0.54  0.43  0.90  -0.75  0.01 
(0.9)  (4.7)  (3.7)  (-3.1) 
Sources: See appendix A. 
a.  The regression  equations use annual data. The labor market variable is the percentage deviation of 
total hours worked from trend, lagged one year, where trend hours are calculated as  the peak-to-peak 
growth of hours worked (in logs). The series for expected inflation are the fitted values in a regression 
of actual inflation on lagged price inflation, lagged wage inflation, lagged changes in the money supply, 
and lagged values of the labor market variable, with two years of lags entered for each variable. The price 
variable is the consumer price index, and the wage variable is the hourly compensation in manufacturing. 
The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  311 
during  1975-77 is due to the slowdown  of price  inflation.  Price  inflation 
itself is basically  driven  by external  shocks  and  exchange  rate  movements 
in this period.  A similar  pattern  has occurred  since  mid-1978.  Because  of 
the sluggishness  of nominal  wage settlements,  there  has been a steep de- 
cline  in real  compensation  per  hour  through  1979 :3. 
Canada  and Japan  show a weaker  influence  of lagged  wage  change  on 
current  rates, and the other countries  display small, negative, and sta- 
tistically insignificant  effects. For none of the countries  other than the 
United States  is it possible  to reject  the hypothesis  that the price expec- 
tations  coefficient  is unity.  This result  is somewhat  surprising  for Canada, 
though should be expected  for the other five countries,  in light of the 
discussion  about long-term  contracts.  Moreover,  the coefficients  on the 
labor market  variable  are large in all the economies  besides the United 
States.  Real wages are determined  in the United  States  by movements  in 
price inflation  relative  to lagged  wage change.  Elsewhere,  it appears  that 
real wage change  is a function  of unemployment  levels, with no role for 
price inflation. 
The wage  equations  and  anecdotal  evidence  point  to more  sluggishness 
of nominal  wages  in the United  States  than  abroad.  But it must  be under- 
lined that these results  are preliminary,  and are not particularly  strong. 
Further  econometric  work is needed to test cross-equation  restrictions 
suggested  by the evidence.  Can a more rapid  pass-through  of changes  in 
the money  supply  into prices  be shown  for Germany  than for the United 
States,  for example?  The value of this type of investigation  seems clear 
though  the work  has only begun. 
Conclusion 
I have  applied  a broad  brush  to the complicated  macroeconomic  events 
of the 1970s. The general  perspective  was necessary  to obtain  a manage- 
able overview  of wage behavior  and its implications  in recent  years.  All 
data point to a clear message: the favorable  growth  of the 1960s was 
accompanied  by a high  and stable  profit  share;  the slowdown  in the 1970s 
was preceded  by a dramatic  rise in real wages and a shift in income dis- 
tribution  toward  labor  in most large  economies.  I have argued  that these 
facts  require  a modification  of the Keynesian,  demand-side  analysis  of the 
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But a broad view can be no substitute  for detailed analysis, on a 
country-by-country  as  well as a comparative  basis.  I should  like  to mention 
some  directions  in which  further  research  is urgently  needed.  Most  impor- 
tant  is an econometric  investigation  of the aggregate  supply  relationships 
proposed  in the paper.  The theoretical  and econometric  challenge  is to 
estimate  aggregate  supply equations,  based on production  technology, 
which  allow  for competitive  supply  determination  over  time,  while  permit- 
ting demand-constrained,  Keynesian  equilibria  during  a business cycle. 
The sophisticated  methods  of estimating  aggregate  supply  schedules  rely 
on the continuous  satisfaction  of first-order  conditions  for profit  maximi- 
zation.  The new econometric  methods  of disequilibrium  estimation  must 
be combined  with the procedures  for estimating  aggregate  supply  func- 
tions  if the  ideas  in this  paper  are  to be rigorously  tested. 
Second, the evidence on wage setting presents a myriad of econo- 
metric  challenges  for wage equations.  For instance,  are the wage-setting 
institutions  sufficiently  stable  to identify  timing  lags statistically  in aggre- 
gate data?  I am confident  that the answer  is yes, but accurate  tests will 
require  far more institutional  knowledge  on an individual  country  basis. 
Moreover,  recent  theoretical  models of long-term  contracts  must  be ex- 
tended  to provide  a more  realistic  basis  for empirical  estimation  of wage- 
setting  processes. 
Finally, priority  should be given to careful,  institutional  study  of the 
various incomes policies applied throughout  the developed economies 
since 1975. Important  success  has occurred  in the last two or three  years 
in reducing  real wage settlements  to levels consistent  with the slower 
growth  of productivity  and the adverse  terms-of-trade  movements.  Part 
of that  success  must  be attributed  to the painful  ordeal  of high  unemploy- 
ment and slow growth,  but another  part is from the successful  applica- 
tion of "social  contracts,"  payroll  tax cuts, wage and price  controls,  and 
other policy instruments.  It is especially  important  today to understand 
how  these  policy  choices  have  fared.  With  the substantial  hike  in oil prices 
in 1979, these  policies  will again  be invoked  as a part  of macroeconomic 
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APPENDIX  A 
Primary  Data: Sources  and Methodology 
PRIMARY DATA SOURCES and methods of data construction are provided 
here that are not described  elsewhere  in the text. 
For the manufacturing  sector,  almost  all data are from  the U.S.  Bureau 
of  Labor  Statistics  (BLS),  Office  of  Productivity  and  Technology.  The 
main publications  are "Output  per Hour,  Hourly  Compensation,  and Unit 
Labor  Costs  in  Manufacturing,  Eleven  Countries,  1950-1978"  (BLS, 
July 10,  1979);  "Underlying  Data  for Indexes  of Output  per Hour,  Hourly 
Compensation,  and  Unit  Labor  Costs  in  Manufacturing,  Eleven  Coun- 
tries,  1950-78"  (BLS,  July  1979);  and  "Data  Sources  and  Methods  for 
Indexes  of Output per Hour,  Hourly  Compensation,  and Unit  Labor  Costs 
in Manufacturing,  12  Countries"  (BLS,  October  1976). 
For  the  nonmanufacturing  sector  (including  government  and  private 
nonmanufacturing)  and  the  aggregate  economy,  important  data  sources 
include National Accounts ESA, 1970-76  (Luxembourg: Statistical Office 
of  the  European  Communities,  1978),  and  earlier  issues;  International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; and the 
following  OECD  publications:  Labour  Force  Statistics,  1956-1967 
(Paris:  1969),  and later issues; Main Economic  Indicators, Historical 
Statistics, 1965-1975  (Paris:  1977),  and later issues; and National Ac- 
counts of OECD Countries, 1965-1976  (Paris:  1977),  and other issues. 
The  specific  time-series  are as follows. 
Manufacturing 
All  series  are from  "Output  per  Hour"  and  "Underlying  Data  for  In- 
dexes."  The output  series is real value-added  originating  in manufacturing, 
except  in Japan  where  it is an index  of industrial  production. 
The  hourly  compensation  is  total  compensation  to  employees  divided 
by total hours  worked.  The  data for the United  States  and Canada  include 
estimates  for  self-employed  workers.  Compensation  is  defined  in  "Data 
Sources  and Methods"  to include  "all payments  made  [to]  employees,  be- 
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legally-required  insurance  programs  and contractual  and private  insur- 
ance  and  welfare  plans  [including  all social security  contributions]." 
The value-added  deflator  is derived  by dividing  total nominal GDP 
originating  in manufacturing  by real  GDP (both series  from  "Underlying 
Data for Indexes"). In Canada,  Italy, Japan,  and the United Kingdom 
the data  for nominal  GDP is at factor cost, while in other countries  it is 
measured  at market  prices (that is, including  indirect  taxes). It was im- 
portant  to convert  the market-value  GDP series  to a factor-cost  basis.  To 
this end, the nominal  GDP series at market  prices were multiplied  by 
(1  -  tax), where tax is the rate of indirect taxation for the entire economy 
(indirect  taxes  in the manufacturing  sector  alone were not available). 
Labor's  share  is calculated  as the ratio of total compensation  to total 
GDP at factor cost (as described  above). Except in Canada,  Germany, 
and the United  States,  the compensation  data  exclude  the self-employed. 
Because  of data  limitations,  I made  no attempt  to adjust  the  compensation 
series  in the remaining  countries  to include  the labor  income of the self- 
employed.  The failure  to adjust  the series  makes  little difference  in Japan 
and the United Kingdom,  where  the proportion  of self-employed  in the 
total manufacturing  work  force is small  and stable.  The problem  is more 
serious  for France  and Italy,  where  the proportion  of self-employed  labor 
declines  over time, leading  to an increase  in the measured  share  of em- 
ployee compensation  in manufacturing  GDP. (An increasing  proportion 
of income is counted as employee  compensation.)  I experimented  with 
the time-series,  and it appears  that  this trend  may account  for an increase 
of between 1 and 2 percentage  points in labor's share during 1960-78 
(compared  with a measured  increase  in Italy of 6 percentage  points  over 
the  period). 
Hours  worked  and  hours  per employee  are  from  "Output  per  Hour." 
Aggregate  Economy 
Output is  real  GDP  from  National  Accounts  of  OECD  Countries 
for 1960-70, and  from  OECD  Economic  Outlook (Paris: OECD), vari- 
ous issues,  for more  recent  data. 
Compensation  is total employee compensation  (from National Ac- 
counts  of  OECD  Countries),  with  an  imputation  for  self-employed 
workers.  Details on the estimation  process  used for that imputation  are 
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A value-added  deflator  at factor  cost is defined  as the ratio  of nominal 
GDP at factor  cost to real GDP at factor cost. Nominal GDP at factor 
cost  is  computed  (from  National  Accounts  of  OECD  Countries)  as 
nominal  GDP at market  prices minus net indirect  taxes. Real GDP at 
factor  cost is not available  in the OECD data;  real GDP at market  prices 
was used in its place (with an appropriate  rescaling).  The ratio of these 
two series  yields an approximate  deflator  at factor cost; it is exact if net 
indirect  taxes on an industry  are, in every  industry,  the same  proportion 
of value-added. 
Labor's  share  is equal  to total compensation  (including  the imputation 
for the self-employed)  divided  by GDP at factor  cost. 
Average  hours  per employee  are from a study  by Christensen,  Cum- 
mings,  and Jorgenson.53  Data on average  hours per employee  were col- 
lected for a number  of countries  through  1973. I updated  this series by 
regressing  it on hours per employee  in manufacturing,  time (t),  and t2 
for 1955-73, and using  the fitted  coefficients  to extrapolate  to 1978 (the 
series  of hours  per employee  in manufacturing  is available  for 1950-78 
im  "Output  per Hour"). 
Total hours  worked  is calculated  as the product  of average  hours  per 
employee  and the total occupied  work force (wage-and-salary  workers 
plus the self-employed). 
Hourly  compensation  is equal to total compensation  divided  by total 
hours  worked. 
Nonmanufacturing  Sector 
Labor's  share  in the private  nonmanufacturing  sector  is calculated  by 
subtracting  from total compensation  the compensation  in manufacturing 
and government  services,  and dividing  by nominal  GDP at factor  cost in 
the private  nonmanufacturing  sector.  By accounting  convention,  compen- 
sation  in the government  sector,  COMPGov,  is virtually  identical  with  total 
GDP originating  in the government  sector, GDP0ov. For simplicity,  I 
measure COMPGOV as 0.97  (GDPGov). 
Real output in private nonmanufacturing  is simply total real GDP 
minus  the sum  of real  GDP in manufacturing  and  real  GDP  in government 
53. See Laurits R.  Christensen, Dianne Cummings, and Dale  W. Jorgenson, 
"Economic Growth, 1947-1973:  An International  Comparison,"  Discussion Paper 
521 (Harvard  University, Institute of Economic Research, Decemnber  1976). 316  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
services.  Real GDP in government  services  is from  National  Accounts  of 
OECD Countries and, where OECD data are not  available, from 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1977, vol. 1, Individual Coun- 
try  Data (United  Nations,  1978), and  earlier  volumes. 
Labor  Market  Tightness 
For the aggregate  economy,  labor  market  tightness  is calculated  as the 
percentage  deviation  of total hours  worked  from trend.  Trend  hours are 
calculated  by linear interpolation  between cyclical peaks of hours (in 
logs) for each country.  After the most recent  peak,  the trend  series  is ex- 
tended according  to the growth  rate between the penultimate  and final 
peak. 
Consumer  Price  Index,  Money  Supply 
The consumer  price  index  and  the money  supply  are  from  International 
Financial  Statistics.  The money supply is the sum of the "money"  and 
"quasi-money"  series. 
APPENDIX  B 
Summary  of Wage-Setting  Institutions  in 
Seven  Industrial  Economies 
THE  FOLLOWING  TABLE  provides  a summary  of collective  bargaining  and 
certain  other  wage-setting  patterns  in the seven industrial  economies  dis- 
cussed  in the  text.54 
54.  For a more detailed discussion see  Barkin, ed.,  Worker Militancy; Anne 
Romanis Braun, "Indexation  of Wages and Salaries in Developed Economies,"  IMF 
Staff Papers, vol. 23  (March 1976),  pp. 226-71;  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Characteristics  of Agreements Covering 1,000 Workers  or More, July 1, 1972, Bul- 
letin 1784 (Government  Printing  Office, 1973); International  Labour Office,  Collec- 
tive Bargaining in Industrialised Market Economies  (Geneva:  ILO,  1974);  and 
Derek Torrington,  ed., Comparative  Industrial  Relations in Europe (London: Asso- 
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Discussion 
William  H. Branson:  This paper by Jeffrey  Sachs analyzes  macroeco- 
nomic developments  in the major  OECD countries  in the 1970s. After 
describing  the course  of wages  in these countries,  Sachs  presents  a model 
of a small,  price-taking  open economy  with two sectors  plus government 
services  and  then  notes several  features  of macroeconomic  developments 
that  are consistent  with the predictions  of that model. Thus the theory  is 
used  to gain  perspective  on the data;  no econometric  testing  is attempted 
except  for some wage equations  at the end of the paper.  The major  con- 
clusions  of the author  are that a fundamentally  exogenous increase  of 
real wages  relative  to the trend  of productivity  occurred  in most of these 
countries  during  1969-73, and that this was followed by downward  re- 
sistance  of real  wages  after  the oil crisis  of 1973-74 in Europe  and  Japan, 
but  not in North  America.  That difference  accounts  for the persistence  of 
stagnation  in Europe and Japan.  The paper consolidates  and codifies a 
view  of the current  macro  problem  in Europe  and  Japan  that  is becoming 
the conventional  wisdom  and that might  be called "neo-structuralist."  In 
broad  terms  I agree  with most of Sachs' analysis;  in fact I presented  a 
paper  with a colleague  at a conference  in Paris last month that reached 
broadly  the same  conclusions.'  And Sachs  was a discussant  of that paper. 
I do have some  points  to make,  though,  about  the details  of the theory 
and interpretation  of results. Sachs develops a price-taking  model and 
modifies  it to include  the effects  of terms  of trade  and indirect  taxes. The 
analysis  focuses  on the effects  of an exogenous  increase  in the real wage. 
A series of tables reveal that the actual increase  in product  wages and 
labor's  share,  and  the fall in manufacturing's  share  of output  and  in profit 
1. See William H.  Branson and Julio Rotemberg, "International Adjustment 
with Wage  Rigidities"  (forthcoming  in European  Economnic  Review). 
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rates  in the major  OECD economies  during  1969-73 are all consistent 
with  this model. 
The model is now standard  theory.  The recent  literature  using such a 
structure  includes  papers  by Calmfors  and by Argy and Salop that as- 
sume  rigid  real  wages,  and  Soderstr6m  and  Viotti and Katseli-Papaefstra- 
tiou with rigid nominal wages.2  Also, McKinnon  has written a paper 
noting  the ineffectiveness  of fiscal expenditure  on tradable  goods in this 
framework.3  However,  all these authors  have applied  the model  to single, 
small economies  facing an exogenous world, while Sachs applies it to 
data  from  the major  OECD  countries.  During  the 1970s, policy was fre- 
quently  coordinated  in Europe,  and  sometimes  in the entire  area.  Thus  the 
three  blocs  of North  America,  Europe,  and  Japan  probably  should  not be 
modeled  as price-takers  for tradable  goods because  that ignores  the feed- 
back  from  events  inside  these  blocs to world  prices.  Using a small-country 
model  here  makes  me uneasy.  I would  prefer  a several-country  simulation 
model such as that developed  by Bruno and Sachs, or the two-country 
model  used  by Branson  and  Rotemberg.4 
I have  not worked  through  the entire  paper  to trace  the effects  of biases 
induced  by ignoring  this simultaneity,  but an example  is in the table  com- 
paring  warranted  and  actual  wage  growth.  If, in fact, wage  increases  push 
up the price  of tradable  manufactures,  when they are taken  to be exoge- 
nous  in the model,  the measured  excess  of actual  over  warranted  increase 
in nominal  wages  will be an underestimate.  Here, the bias works  in favor 
of Sachs'  argument. 
The econometric  results  on the existence  of nominal  wage  stickiness,  or 
"money  illusion"  as it used to be called,  show sticky  nominal  wages with 
2.  See Lars Calmfors, "Real Wages, Inflation, and Unemployment in the Open 
Economy," and Hans Tson S6derstr6m and Staffan Viotti, "Money Wage Distur- 
bances and the Endogeneity of the Public Sector in an Open Economy," in Assar 
Lindbeck, ed., Inflation and Employment in Open Economies, Studies in Interna- 
tional Economics, vol. 5 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979), pp. 41-69 and 71-98, 
respectively;  Victor Argy and Joanne Salop, "Price and Output Effects of Monetary 
and Fiscal Expansion in a Two-Country World under Flexible Exchange Rates" 
(International Monetary Fund, May 1979); and Louka T. Katseli-Papaefstratiou, 
"Transmission  of External Price Disturbances  and the Composition of Trade,"  Dis- 
cussion Paper 305 (Yale Growth Center, 1979). 
3. See Ronald I. McKinnon, "The Limited Role of  Fiscal Policy in an Open 
Economy,"  Weltwirtschaf  tliches A  rchiv (forthcoming in 1979). 
4.  See Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, "Supply  versus Demand Approaches to 
the Problem of Stagflation,"  Working  Paper 382 (National Bureau of Economic Re- 
search, 1979); and Branson and Rotemberg, "International  Adjustment." 322  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
little response  to demand  in the United States. In Europe, Japan, and 
Canada  the results  suggest  the absence  of money illusion and, instead, 
effectively  indexed  wages.  They support  Sachs'  argument  that monetary 
policy can affect  output  in the short  run in the United States  but not in 
Europe  or Japan.  These  results  are  supported  by the equations  in Branson 
and Rotemberg,  which use a more traditional  model of adaptive  wage 
adjustment,  without  relying on the estimation  of expected prices with 
instrument  variables.5 
Sachs recognizes  the role of weak investment  in the story of 1970s 
stagnation,  especially  in Europe,  and also recognizes  the need for further 
work  in this  area.  I think  this line of research  is crucial.  The slowdown  in 
investment  in Europe  since  the early 1970s must  be reducing  productivity 
growth  and creating  short-run  "capital  shortages"  that prevent  cyclical 
recovery  from achieving  full employment  of labor. In a recent study, 
Halttunen  and Warner  report  calculations  of the cumulative  shortfall  in 
investment  relative  to the path of the capital stock that would be con- 
sistent  with  full-employment  output.6  They  compute  the capital  stock  that 
would be required  to employ the full-employment  labor force for ten 
major  OECD  countries,  given  the trend  growth  in real wages since 1973. 
The computed  stock is then compared  with the actual  capital  stock, and 
the percentage  shortfall  of actual  below full-employment  capital  stock in 
1979 is labeled the "capital  gap."  These numbers  run to 25 percent  for 
industry  in Japan  and the Netherlands;  20 percent  in France and Ger- 
many; 15 percent in Belgium-Luxembourg  and the United Kingdom; 
10 percent  in Canada,  Sweden, and Italy; and 5 percent  in the United 
States. The cumulative  effect of the investment  slump in Europe and 
Japan  is bound  to be important  in the analysis  of the productivity  slow- 
down, and Sachs is  pointing out an important problem for further 
research. 
Although  I am  mildly  critical  of some aspects  of the analysis,  I like this 
paper  very much. It will be a good example of the BPEA paradigm,  a 
paper  that  is widely  read  by people  who are  trying  to understand  what  has 
been  happening. 
5.  Branson  and Rotemberg,  "International  Adjustment." 
6.  See Hannu Halttunen and Dennis Warner,  "A Model of Trade and Exchange 
Rate Projections,"  Working Paper 389  (National Bureau of  Economic Research, 
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Robert  J. Gordon: Jeffrey  Sachs'  paper  is dazzling  in the  variety  of talents 
that  are  brought  to bear  on a difficult  and  controversial  topic  of enormous 
scope. It is rare to find such a rich mixture  in a single paper: a simple 
theoretical  model  is used  to develop  a novel  hypothesis;  painstaking  effort 
is employed  to construct  the requisite  data  for a number  of countries;  and 
(perhaps  most commendable  of all) the paper not only presents  inter- 
country  differences  in results  but also attempts  to explain  them  by an ap- 
peal to institutional  detail.  The main  problems  with  the paper  are  that  the 
empirical  data do not provide  strong  supporting  evidence  for several  of 
the basic  hypotheses,  and that  puzzles  emerge  in intercountry  differences 
in behavior  that  are  neither  explained  by the author's  framework  nor ad- 
dressed  in his discussion  of results. 
The author's  hypotheses  can be divided  into two groups,  those apply- 
ing to the early 1970s before the 1973-74 OPEC oil shock, and those 
applying  to the postshock adjustment.  For the earlier period, Sachs 
argues  that an autonomous  wage push resulted  in a unique  step-like  in- 
crease  in the share of labor compensation  in national  income. This in- 
crease  in real  wages  relative  to productivity  in turn  induced  a reallocation 
of resources  from the tradable-goods  sector to the nontradable-goods 
sector  of most  economies-through the intervention  of a stimulative  fiscal 
policy to avert the higher unemployment  that the excessive real wage 
would  otherwise  have caused. 
For the period  since 1973, the paper's  emphasis  shifts  from  the conse- 
quences  of an autonomous  shift in the real wage to differences  among 
countries  in the response  of the real wage  to an external  supply  shock.  In 
the United  States,  sluggish  adjustment  in nominal wages  and  partial  cost- 
of-living  escalation  create  a direct  negative  correlation  between  external 
price shocks and the real wage, giving  to monetary  policy the ability  to 
stimulate  output by moving the U.S. economy out along its positively 
sloped aggregate  supply  curve.  But in other  nations,  where  cost-of-living 
escalation  is complete  (either  explicitly  written  into contracts  or implicitly 
as a matter  of practice), the real wage is insulated  from external  price 
shocks  at any given  unemployment  rate.  This leaves slack demand  as the 
only  lever  that  remains  for policymakers  to use in forcing  down  real  wages 
in tandem  with  productivity  following  a price  shock,  and  makes  the aggre- 
gate supply  curve  steep or vertical.  And it fosters the interpretation  that 
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resulted  not from a greater  distaste  for inflation  but rather  from the fear 
that  monetary  expansion  would  generate  a fruitless  movement  up a steep 
aggregate  supply  curve. 
Some  of Sachs'  conclusions  are  likely  to meet  ready  acceptance  because 
they  are  neither  novel  nor surprising.  Much  of the paper  can be viewed  as 
extending  and  tying  together  conclusions  previously  reached  in a series  of 
comparative  cross-country  studies.  Several  of these  have  been  presented  in 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity and are cited by Sachs. Although 
the initial  study  by Nordhaus  of the pre-1973  wage  explosion  rejected  the 
notion  of an autonomous  wage push except  in the case of France,  Perry 
subsequently  provided  strong  support  for an autonomous  push that he 
interpreted  as a conflict over income shares.' Subsequently,  my eight- 
country  comparison  confirmed  the autonomous  push in quarterly  data.2 
An autonomous  push  in nominal  wages  by itself implies  nothing  about 
real  wages  or income  shares.  Sachs  devotes  all his attention  to the process 
of wage determination  and completely neglects the determination  of 
prices.  His finding  that  the autonomous  wage  push  in Germany,  Italy,  and 
the United  Kingdom  was accompanied  by an increase  in labor's  share  im- 
plies that firms  did not "pass  through"  the wage  push  fully in the form  of 
higher  prices. In a previous  paper I found that the wage push was not 
passed  through  and attributed  the success  of workers  in achieving  a shift 
in income  shares  to the existence  of fixed  exchange  rates: "labor  gains  be- 
cause  its wage rate increases  relative  to the prices  of nontraded  contract 
goods and  relative  to the prices  of traded  goods (if the exchange  rate re- 
mains constant)."3  While this argument helps to explain why no major 
episode  of wage push has been observed  in the era of flexible  exchange 
rates,  it leaves  open a question  about  the 1969-73 period-if  exporters  in 
all major  industrial  nations  were faced by higher  labor costs simultane- 
ously,  why  were  they  not able  to raise  prices  in tandem? 
1. William D. Nordhaus, "The Worldwide  Wage Explosion,"  BPEA, 2:1972, pp. 
431-64;  George L.  Perry, "Determinants of  Wage Inflation around the World," 
BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 403-35. 
2.  Robert J. Gordon, "World  Inflation and Monetary Accommodation in Eight 
Countries,"  BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 409-68. 
3. Robert  J. Gordon, "The Demand for and Supply of Inflation,"  Journal  of Lawv 
and Economics, vol. 18 (December 1975),  p. 818  (Proceedings of  a Conference, 
"Economic Analysis of  Political Behavior," Universities-National Bureau Confer- 
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For the period  before 1973, the main  contribution  of the paper  is not 
in the discovery  or explanation  of the shift in income shares,  but rather 
in the analysis  of its consequences.  The author  points  to the higher  labor 
share  in manufacturing  as the source  of a relative  slowdown  in the growth 
of manufacturing  output;  and he then stresses  the role of fiscal  policy in 
preventing  the manufacturing  slowdown  from causing  increased  aggre- 
gate unemployment.  But the story  is unconvincing  in many  of the coun- 
tries.  Only the data  for Germany  and the United Kingdom-that is, two 
of the seven countries-seem to support  the central  interpretation.  For 
each of the other  countries  there  is an inconsistency.  In Canada  there  is 
no meaningful  shift in shares,  but manufacturing  output growth slows 
down almost  as much  as in Germany  and more  than in the United King- 
dom. In France,  after 1969, the product  wage rises faster than produc- 
tivity in manufacturing  according  to table 2; but manufacturing  output 
essentially  maintains  its growth  according  to table 6. In Italy  the share  of 
labor  increases  in both manufacturing  and  nonmanufacturing  after  1969, 
while the growth  of output slows in both sectors; this raises questions 
about  the source  of the differential  growth  of labor's  share  in manufactur- 
ing in other  countries  because  the Italian  economy  was equally  open. In 
Japan  the slowdown  in manufacturing  growth  after 1969, shown  in table 
6, is not supported  by any appreciable  shift  in shares (table 3). 
For  the  United  States,  the  slowdown  of manufacturing  output  presented 
in table 6 is sensitive  to Sachs' choice of 1962 as the beginning  of his 
initial  period.  Measured  against  a longer  period,  it appears  that  the slow- 
down  in manufacturing,  as shown  in data from the national  income and 
product  accounts,  was  only  minor  during  the 1969-73 period  when  labor's 
share  increased,  but was major  in 1973-78 when labor's  share  was con- 
stant: 
Annual growth rates of real 
gross domestic product 
Sector  1955-69  1969-73  1973-78 
Manufacturing  3.7  3.2  1.8 
Nonmanufacturing, 
including  government  3.6  3.5  2.8 
Government  3.4  0.7  1.5 
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Finally,  in his alnalysis  of the 1969-73 period,  Sachs  may overempha- 
size fiscal  policy and slight  monetary  policy. The extent of the accelera- 
tion  of government  GDP (table  7) for Germany  and  the United  Kingdom 
seems too small to support  the interpretation  that fiscal policy was a 
major  force  in maintaining  full employment.  In contrast,  I demonstrated 
in my BPEA paper  that the money supply  measured  in "wage  units"  in 
the main industrialized  countries outside the United States declined 
markedly  in 1970 and then increased  very rapidly  in 1971 and 1972. 
Allowing  for lags and for the fact that housing  was one of the leading 
sectors  in the expansion  of 1972-73, the manufacturing  recession  that 
occurred  in 1971 in Germany,  Japan,  Italy, and  the United  Kingdom  and 
the subsequent  worldwide  boom in 1973 seem quite consistent  with a 
monetarist  interpretation  that points to U.S. dollar  outflows  in 1970-71 
as the primary  initiating  force. This qualification  to Sachs'  analysis  does 
not deny his claim that policy accommodation  "ratified"  the 1969-70 
wage  push  in some countries,  but rather  underlines  the role of monetary 
rather  than  fiscal  accommodation. 
The sections  of the paper  devoted  to the 1973-78 experience  provide 
several  types of evidence  relevant  to Herbert  Giersch's  hypothesis  that 
different  degrees of rigidity  in real wages among countries  justify the 
reluctance  of some  countries,  particularly  Germany  and  Japan,  to expand 
their  economies  during  the recovery  beginning  in 1975. There  can be no 
quarrel  with  the essential  theoretical  role played  by real  wage  flexibility  in 
the macroeconomic  adjustment  to supply shocks; the response of real 
wages  and  the effect  of indexation  were  central  elements  in my early  anal- 
ysis of policy responses  to supply  shocks, and a more general  and com- 
plete treatment  of aggregate  supply and real wage rigidity  has recently 
been provided  in a paper  by Branson  and Rotemberg.4 
Because  an adverse  supply  shock lowers  the real wage relative  to the 
product  wage, any rigidity  of real wages tends to push up product  wages 
and hence  labor's  share.  Thus the validity  of the Giersch  hypothesis  can 
be tested through  an inspection  of the time-series  behavior of labor's 
share. Countries  with a completely  flexible real wage would exhibit a 
constant  share  of labor.  Countries  with a completely  rigid  real  wage that 
is insensitive  to economic  slack would exhibit  a jump  in labor's  share  at 
the time of the supply  shock and no subsequent  drop  in labor's  share  in 
4.  William H. Branson and Julio Rotemberg, "International  Adjustment with 
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subsequent periods  following  the  supply shock.  An  intermediate case 
would be a slowly adjusting real wage that is sensitive to economic slack, 
leading to  a sequence  in which labor's share initially jumps but  then 
declines during a subsequent period of  slack. Because  averages during 
the  1973-75  and  1975-78  intervals  disguise  important  movements 
within these intervals, it is necessary to focus on average annual change, 
relying on table 2 of the paper: 
Change in labor's share (percentage points over interval) 
1973  1975  1973 
to 1975  to 1978  to 1978 
United States  -0.2  0.6  0.4 
Germany  1.6  -5.4  -3.8 
Canada  1.6  -0.6  1.0 
France  5.0  0.6  5.6 
Italy  6.0  -0.3  5.7 
United Kingdom  8.4  -1.5  6.9 
Japan  9.4  -4.2  5.2 
The data are constructed by calculating the difference between  annual 
average changes in the product wage and those in productivity for the 
intervals shown, and then multiplying by the number of years in the inter- 
val to obtain cumulative changes. 
The seven countries are listed here in order of the increase in labor's 
share during the initial  1973-75  period of  supply shocks. Clearly, the 
United States displays the share constancy required by the Giersch hy- 
pothesis,  and the  four  countries listed  last  display  a marked jump in 
labor's share after  1973  that persisted through  1978.  The  downward 
adjustment in the growth of  product wages was too  small and too  late 
in these four countries to  roll back labor's share significantly. But the 
behavior of labor's share in Germany presents a sharp contrast. Not only 
did it rise relatively little from 1973 to 1975, but it dropped sharply from 
1975  to  1978,  falling back to  its  1970  level.  And  it has continued to 
decline through the  middle  of  1979.  In contrast to  Sachs' unqualified 
support of Giersch, I must ask whether a trip that long was necessary. 
Germany could have avoided a needless restriction of its own economy as 
well as the world economy in  1975-78  and could have pursued a sub- 
stantially more expansionary policy  if it had been willing to  settle for 
rolling back labor's share to its 1973, rather than 1970, level. 
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table 10. From the accompanying  discussion  it would appear  that the 
table  demonstrates  major  differences  between  wage  behavior  in the  United 
States  and in Germany,  but I think that interpretation  is too hasty. The 
aim  ultimately  is to examine  the effects  of a monetary  expansion  on infla- 
tion  and  real  output  growth.  The Giersch  hypothesis  predicts  that  a mone- 
tary  expansion  leads  mainly  to output  growth  in the United  States  and to 
inflation  in Germany.  But the Sachs'  regression  equations  cannot  help us 
trace  differential  impacts  of money  because  we are given no information 
on the subsidiary  equations  used to estimate  inflation  expectations.  The 
German  wage equations  with strong labor-market  effects and unitary 
price-expectation  coefficients  are compatible  with a stimulative  effect of 
a monetary  expansion  on real output  if the equation  explaining  inflation 
has a coefficient  on monetary  change that is less than unity.5  A major 
piece  of evidence  contradicting  the Giersch  hypothesis  is the output  boom 
in Germany  from 1971 to 1973 following  the 1971 monetary  explosion, 
with  only  a modest  acceleration  of inflation. 
Upon reexamination,  one of the most striking  aspects  of Perry's  paper 
is the amazing  similarity  of the best-fitting  German  and U.S. wage equa- 
tions for his sample  period,  which ended in 1972, with the exception  of 
the significance  of an autonomous  push  variable  in the German  equation. 
This raises crucial questions  that Sachs' paper does not address.  Was 
there  a radical  structural  shift  in German  wage behavior  after 1972, and 
if so, how is it to be explained?  What  is the explanation  of the steepness 
of the German  Phillips  curve  in Sachs'  equations  compared  to the simi- 
lality of the U.S. and German  labor-market  effects in Perry's  results? 
Japan shows an even greater  difference  from the United States in its 
steeper  short-nin  Phillips curve, another  result at variance  with Perry's. 
Overall  I suspect  that  table 10 tells us little about  real-wage  rigidity,  and 
its main  result  of much steeper  Phillips  curves  outside  the United States 
may  be coming  almost  entirely  from a few observations  in the post-1972 
portion  of the sample  period. 
Finally,  where  does this leave the discussion  of labor market  institu- 
tions?  In contrast  to the nominal  wage inertia  produced  by U.S. wage- 
setting  practices,  in Europe frequent  and centralized  bargaining  seems 
mainly  to cut loose the nominal  wage from its own past values and to 
5.  In the reduced-form  inflation equation presented for West Germany in my 
1977 BPEA paper, the sum of coefficients  on the current and four lagged quarterly 
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create anomalous and unpredictable patterns of behavior to bedevil econ- 
ometricians. To  show that institutional differences account for different 
patterns of serial correlation in nominal wage data is not the same thing as 
to show that real-wage rigidity is an important or pervasive phenomenon. 
Nevertheless,  despite the fact that I do not find the last part of Sachs' 
paper as convincing as he does, I heartily endorse his emphasis on institu- 
tional differences and demonstrate my agreement with his approach by 
quoting the last sentence of my 1977 BPEA paper: 
The dramatic contrast  between the volatility of changes in the wage rate in 
some of the Other  Seven countries  and the sluggish changes exhibited  by the 
United States reminds us that we all take for granted characteristics  of the 
U.S.  economy that depend ultimately on its labor-market  institutions and 
that would change dramatically  if those institutions resembled the ones in 
Europe and Japan.6 
Jeffrey D.  Sachs: Robert Gordon  disputes the view that the real-wage 
boom played a major role in the slowdown in manufacturing after 1970, 
writing that "Only the data for Germany and the United Kingdom...  seem 
to support the central interpretation." I read the evidence differently. In 
Italy, he notes, labor's share rises in both sectors and output decelerates 
in both. This is precisely the aggregate supply effect that I outline.  In 
France, where labor's share does not rise during 1969-73,  no slowdown 
occurs in manufacturing output or in investment. Gordon cites correctly 
my tabular presentation for Japan, which shows that the average labor 
share during 1969-73  does not rise appreciably. But, by 1973, the level 
of the labor share in manufacturing (0.56)  is far higher than the 1962-69 
average (0.51).  The dramatic slowdown in the manufacturing sector is 
well timed with the profit squeeze. In Canada the rise in labor's share 
occurs in 1967-68,  rather than in 1969-70,  but the increase is marked; 
and according to the simple regression results of output on wage change, 
is well timed with the manufacturing slowdown. The link between product 
wages and output holds for most if not all of the economies. I believe that 
further econometric work will bear this out. 
Gordon also challenges the role of high real wages during 1973-78  in 
the important case of Germany. He notes that, by  1978,  the aggregate 
labor share declines to its level of  1970. But a clue to the continued re- 
luctance of Germany to expand even after the moderation of real wages 
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is found  in tables  3 and 4. None of the reduction  in labor's  share  came  in 
Germany's  massive  manufacturing  sector, and there  was no relief to the 
squeeze  on the corporate  rate  of return  in manufacturing  as late as 1976. 
General  Discussion 
Several  discussants  felt that Sachs  relied too heavily  on a model of a 
small,  price-taking  country  in interpreting  macro  developments  during  the 
seventies. James Duesenberry  pointed to the limitations  of the small- 
country  paradigm  in analyzing  the consequences  of the big wage push  of 
the late sixties,  which  had occurred  simultaneously  in several  large  coun- 
tries.  He noted  that,  if all large  countries  experienced  an identical  spurt  in 
wages, the results would be the same as for a giant closed economy. 
Duesenberry  elaborated  on the need for an analytical  bridge from the 
small-country  view to a model  for a group  of large  countries.  The relative 
competitiveness  of the large countries  in tradable  goods should  be taken 
into account.  So should  the opportunities  for coordinated  policy  action  by 
the group. 
Similarly,  James Tobin pointed to several aspects of expansionary 
monetary  policy  that  were  in fact  important  and  that  did  not emerge  in the 
small-country  model. For example,  the depreciation  of the currency  of a 
major country that launched an expansionary  monetary  policy might 
allow other countries  to adopt more expansionary  policies and thereby 
raise global output.  Moreover,  Tobin noted the existence  of lags in the 
response  of wages  that enabled  monetary  policy to stimulate  real income 
and  real  capital  formation  for some  period,  even if the real  wage  returned 
ultimately  to its initial  level. 
On a related  theme,  Marina  Whitman  suggested  that  the small-country 
view affected  Sachs'  discussion  of fiscal policy. In a small country,  any 
effect  of tax cuits  or public  spending  on the tradable  goods sector  would  be 
entirely  a leakage.  That is not the case for large  countries,  although  even 
they would have less leakage if they pinpointed  their fiscal stimulus  on 
nontradable  goods.  Moreover,  tax reductions  undertaken  by a large  coun- 
try have effects on other countries,  similar to the interrelationship  of 
monetary  stimulus  that  Tobin identified,  except  that in the fiscal  case it is 
not clear  whether  the effects  will be positive  or negative. 
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tions and  general  qualitative  conclusions  of the small-country  model ap- 
plied more generally  whenever  there were differential  disturbances  and 
independent  policy responses.  For example,  in a model that assumes  a 
world of two countries,  monetary  policy cannot affect real output in a 
country  that  has  rigid  real  wages. 
While  the group  was impressed  by the evidence  Sachs  presented  on the 
slowdown  of manufacturing  output in the large countries  in the early 
1970s, some members  questioned  his explanation  for that development. 
Duesenberry  recalled  that some less developed  countries  and smaller  in- 
dustrial  countries  had emerged  as stronger  competitors  in world trade 
during  that period;  that may have thereby  curbed  manufactured  exports 
and  hence  total output  of manufacturing  in the large  industrial  countries. 
Duesenberry  also pointed  to a linkage  from  the wage  push  to manufactur- 
ing output  via aggregate  demand,  rather  than supply.  To the extent  that 
the spurt  in wages  squeezed  profits,  it may have curbed  business  fixed  in- 
vestment  and  hence  the output  of capital  goods.  Robert  Lawrence  pointed 
to currency  appreciations  in Japan  and  Germany  and  rapid  inflation  in the 
United Kingdom as reasons for declines in competitiveness  and slow- 
downs  in exports  relative  to output  in these countries,  especially  in 1972. 
Lawrence  also commented  that home building  activity  had been remark- 
ably  strong  in several  countries  at that  time,  contributing  to the shift  in the 
mix of output  away  from manufacturing  and tradable  goods. He felt that 
the  housing  boom  was a reflection  of highly  stimulative  monetary  policies. 
The wage equations  in the paper generated  considerable  discussion. 
Franco  Modigliani  was suspicious  of the use of a lagged,  rather  than  con- 
temporaneous,  variable  for unemployment.  A number  of discussants  were 
concerned  about  the conceptual  and  econometric  implications  of specify- 
ing two effects  of unemployment  and  of lagged  wages-one  direct  and  one 
that worked  through  price expectations.  Tobin questioned  the method- 
ology that  relied  on coefficients  from  an equation  estimated  over  an entire 
sample  period  to generate  expectations  within  that  period.  This technique 
attributed  to people  information  they did not have at the time  they had to 
form  their  expectations.  Martin  Feldstein  noted  the possibility  of updating 
the equations  through  the period  to avoid that problem;  but Sachs indi- 
cated  that  the time-series  data  were  not adequate  to permit  that. 
More generally,  Tobin felt that the process of wage formation  that 
Sachs  described  in the paper  was not captured  fully  in his wage  equations, 
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model, the demand  side should  be present  and should include  variables 
that determine  the marginal  product  of labor, such as the capital  stock 
and the prices  of raw material  inputs. 
Hendrik  Houthakker  joined  Tobin in calling  for a structural  model  of 
the wage  process  that treated  both supply  and demand.  In particular,  he 
felt that  the  rapid  growth  of the  labor  force  in North  America  was  a supply 
influence  that  should  be taken  into account.  Other  factors  that  might  have 
been  significant  in wage  determination  were  mentioned.  Michael  Wachter 
remarked  that  the  flows  of guest  workers  in some  European  countries  and 
flows of labor from the traditional  sector to manufacturing  in Japan 
affected  the wage process in those countries.  Charles  Holt felt that the 
historical  influence  of public  policies  regarding  inflation  upon  the institu- 
tions of wage determination  in the private  sector  was an intriguing  issue 
for further  study. 
Duesenberry,  Arthur Okun, and George Perry saw various ways in 
which  the stress  on the intractability  of real wages  submerged  considera- 
tions  about  demand  and  inflation  that  they  considered  important.  Duesen- 
berry  suggested  that  the state  of global  demand  influenced  the behavior  of 
real wages. With sufficiently  strong  global demand,  a spurt in nominal 
wages  would  be more  likely  to be passed  through  into prices  and  thus  less 
likely to sustain  a higher  real wage. Okun  noted that, in Sachs'  view of 
wage determination  in Europe and Japan, reductions  in indirect  taxes 
were  superior  to monetary  policy  as an  instrument;  they  could  raise  output 
and reduce  inflation  at the same time by raising  real wages relative  to 
product  wages.  Perry  emphasized  that the reluctance  of policymakers  in 
many countries  to adopt stimulative  monetary  policy reflected  a fear of 
the resultant  inflation (especially through a depreciation  of  the cur- 
rency) rather  than  any perception  of rigid  real wages. 
Sachs  responded  to criticisms  of his treatment  of demand-management 
policies.  He suggested  that there  is really  less disagreement  than appears 
because  many  of the comments  explicitly  or implicitly  recognized  that a 
demand  expansion  is most effective  if it leads to a moderation  of real 
wages.  The important  issue in this regard  is whether  strong  demand  can 
slow real wages  by allowing  a larger  pass-through  of nominal  wage in- 
creases into prices. Sachs reiterated  that a higher pass-through  would 
likely  lead to a further  round  of nominal  wage  increases,  thus  maintaining 
real wage growth,  particularly  in countries  with widespread  wage index- 
ation or frequent  bargaining. 